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 Introduction   
 
Recent years in Roman scholarship have been particularly fruitful in the studies of identity, as 
various theoretical frameworks have been invented and employed in order to explain the cultural 
changes brought about by the growth and expansion of the Roman Empire.1 It did not take long to 
come to the idea that what made the Roman society ‘Roman’ as opposed to, for instance, the Greek 
communities glued together by their linguistic and cultural homogeneity, was primarily it’s self-
definition as a citizen community, delineated by the common civitas Romana and the observance of 
civil law.2 Cicero, for instance, provides us with ample evidence of the pride that the Romans took 
in their ius civile (de Orat. 1.197) as well as the significance and exclusivity ascribed to the Roman 
citizenship (Balb. 11.28-30). Similarly, Roman legislation for the province of Egypt points to the 
eager protection of Roman citizenship and strictly Roman legal institutions, and offers severe 
sanctions against violation of status (Gnomon 42-44, 53, 56).3 The idea of exclusivity of Roman law 
and citizenship prevalent in primary (literary and juristic) sources has dominated modern 
scholarship too, for the majority of works thus far have tended to treat both subjects in isolation. 
However, as the Roman expansion evidently came to absorb multiple ethnically and culturally 
diverse societies, the very ‘Romanity’ of the Empire becomes a debatable subject itself. The 
writings of Cicero and later Roman authors appear exceptionally thought-provoking when 
juxtaposed to documentary record from various parts of the Empire, attesting to major and very 
rapid changes in formal (procedural) law, as well as the adoption of exclusively Roman legal 
institutions by the provincials who did not yet possess Roman legal status. How does then the 
discourse of Roman identity correlate with the evidence for cultural, as well as legal and civic 
heterogeneity of the Roman Empire?   
A number of renowned scholars wrote extensively on various institutions and peculiarities of 
Roman law, as well as its influence on both ancient and modern legal systems.4 Legal scholarship, 
however, is rarely interested in questions concerning social, political or cultural implications carried 
                                                          
1 Goldhill (2001), Wallace-Hadrill (2008), Revell (2009), Mattingly (2011) et al. 
2 Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (2008) who notes on the ‘perpetual lopsidedness between the ‘Greek’ and the ‘Roman’ that flows 
from the fact that Rome is a citizen state, with a legally defined membership, and Greece is a geographic area defined 
by its common language’, 34. See also Harries (2006).   
3 BGU 5.1210. 
4 Schulz (1946), Kaser (1975, 1993), Schiller (1978) et al. Occasional works have been written that treat the position of 
Roman law in separate provinces: Wessel (2003) on the province of Africa; Goodman (1991), Cotton (1993) and 
Oudshoorn (2007) on Roman Arabia and Judaea; or, more recently, Korporowicz (2012) on Roman Britain. Roman 
Egypt remains by far the best documented and, accordingly, the most thoroughly researched province: Taubenschlag 
(1948) and Modrzejewski (1990) constitute a solid and comprehensive presentation of changes in Egypt’s legal and 
judicial systems, while the recent monograph of Kelly (2011) contributes greatly to the social history of litigation in the 
said province.  
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by the spread of Roman law and citizenship, e.g. what did it mean to a non-Roman to become 
subject to the State law? Was Roman law paramount to local law in the periphery of Rome or rather 
supplementary and thus only used voluntarily? Or, in what way, if at all, could the availability of 
Roman legal institutions and the acquisition of Roman citizenship have affected one’s local 
identity? Social historians, on the other hand, while engaging with questions of socio-political and 
cultural change or identity formation, frequently lack sufficient knowledge of (Roman) legal 
institutions, what leads to their neglect of a major set of primary evidence.  
To this day there have been rather few attempts to contextualize Roman law; to view it as an 
integral part of social history of the Roman Empire, and to analyse Roman legal institutions within 
the framework of their cultural, political and ideological values. Crook’s Law and Life of Rome was 
the first attempt to place Roman law in its social context, yet it deliberately omits any discussion of 
legal landscape in the provinces.5 More recently, Johnston treated Roman law in its social and 
economic context, but added little new to the discussion due to the spatial limitations of a very brief 
monograph.6 The spread of Roman citizenship into the periphery of Rome is of minor concern in 
the majority of these works too, due to the same tendency towards exclusivity: people are assumed 
to have acted according to their official legal status. The documentary record, however, allows 
seemingly more fluidity in practice.  
One of the pioneer works to treat the history of Roman civitas had focused on the notion of ‘dual 
citizenship’, alliances and citizenship extensions employed by the Romans, as well as discussed 
provincial attitudes towards the Empire and its citizenship, thus concluding that ‘imperial loyalty 
went deeper than is usually believed’.7 More recently, however, Mouritsen has challenged the 
orthodox view which argues for the perceptible significance of Roman citizenship and sees the 
Social War of 90-88 BCE as a struggle of Italian allies towards obtaining Roman citizen status, by 
demonstrating this view to be based on Roman imperial interpretation rather than historical fact.8 
Furthermore, Mouritsen holds the Roman citizenship to have been closely tied with the Roman 
identity and, stressing its incompatibility with any other set of legal relations, argues for its 
uselessness outside the Roman soil. In his interpretation, the culturally distinct Italians fought 
against the Roman hegemony, lost the war, and their eventual enfranchisement led to a ‘politically 
and culturally unified Italy’ as well as complete loss of local identities. As Mouritsen’s approach 
                                                          
5 Crook (1967), 12. Galsterer (2000), for a change, stressed that the legal developments in Roman Egypt have for too 
long been thought of as an exception, and that the evidence from Vindolanda or the Greek East may not be too far 
remote, 345.  
6 Johnston (1999). His study was rather meant to stimulate new research and encourage a ‘more in-depth investigation 
of the issue’, see the review by Chlup (2000).  
7 Sherwin-White (1973).  
8 Mouritsen (1998), (2008). 
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has triggered anew the discussion of the relationship between Roman citizenship and Roman 
identity, the present thesis will engage with his key publications in attempt to reassess the evidence 
at hand.      
Although the question of Roman identity as such has attracted much due attention, its legal and 
civic characteristics, contrary to traits of material culture, religion or language, remain collateral to 
the major debate. As the focus of current scholarship slowly turns away from the imperial centre 
and shifts towards the periphery of Rome, significantly more research attends to questions of 
ethnicity and identity in a multicultural setting of the Roman provinces.9 Notions of cultural 
interaction, fusion and ‘hybridity’ tend to challenge those of apartheid and social stratification in 
the Graeco-Roman world.10 The extent to which these ideas truly apply to the legal and civic lives 
of communities and individuals under the direct Roman influence still needs to be estimated on the 
basis of both literary and documentary evidence.  
Each subject to be addressed in this research has thus been treated on its own merits in scholarly 
literature, yet the co-dependency and interrelation between them remain largely unravelled. 
Furthermore, there is no consensus in scholarship as to the role that Roman law and citizenship had 
to play in the formation and perception of the ‘Roman’ as opposed to the provincial (regional) 
identities. Primary sources regarding the questions raised in this thesis are often contradictory too, 
what calls for a fresh reassessment of the subject matter.  
While the initial premise that this research will work on assumes an intrinsic connection between 
‘Roman-ness’, i.e. ‘being’ or ‘becoming Roman’, and Roman law and citizenship, the investigation 
of the extent to which the three were intertwined and whether it is possible to put all three into 
equation will be the main foci throughout the paper. Amongst the questions to be unravelled is 
whether the spread of Roman law into the periphery signified an open invitation to participate, or 
rather enforced social stratification by being restricted to the Roman citizenry, according to the 
principle of legal personality (as opposed to that of legal territoriality). To what extent were Roman 
legal remedies available to non-Roman components of the Empire, and what did the acquisition of 
Roman citizenship – as exclusively Roman legal status – mean in terms of beneficiary’s legal rights 
and obligations to his local community? Was the acquisition of Roman citizenship merely an ‘extra’ 
status, or rather a tool ‘decapitating’ local communities of their elite members by incorporating 
them into the Roman citizenry, and, simultaneously, making them subject to Roman law? Finally, is 
one’s possession of two (or more) sets of legal and civic relations to be perceived as a mixed or 
‘hybrid’ identity, or rather as two separate ‘identities’ one could juggle according to circumstance?  
                                                          
9 Goudriaan (1992), Vandorpe (2012). 
10 Cf. McCoskey (2002), 29. 
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Generally, the present research is placed between the two major citizenship grants: the 
enfranchisement of Latin and Italian allies after the Social War in 90/89 BCE and the universal 
citizenship grant by the Constitutio Antoniniana in 212 CE. The two geographical focal points are 
Italy shortly before and after the Social War, and the (Eastern) provinces of the mid-second century 
CE. The first focus is unanimously perceived as a turning point in Roman citizenship policy and, as 
such, offers insights into both Roman and regional attitudes towards Roman citizenship extension; 
while the second one provides ample documentary record, roughly contemporary with the most 
relevant juristic writings.  
The present thesis will argue that the interrelation between Roman law, Roman citizenship and 
Roman identity was fairly more complex and flexible than has been largely assumed. Furthermore, 
the importance of context and circumstance will be put forward, by employing an agent-based 
approach. In other words, the present research will turn its focus on collective and individual 
initiatives, as well as legal or social manoeuvring and opportunistic behaviour of the subject 
population. This way, a more nuanced picture of the development of Roman law and citizenship 
policy in terms of their availability, significations and perception should emerge.  
One of the main aims of this research will thus be to re-contextualize and reinterpret the Social War 
in terms of its contribution to the creation of ‘politically and culturally unified’ Italy. The thesis will 
argue that the role played by Rome and her eventual citizenship extension was of somewhat lesser 
significance than some scholars, with Mouritsen at the forefront, take it to be; and that the outcome 
of the Social War as we know it was a result of a much longer development, no less defined by the 
voluntary agency and opportunistic behaviour of the allies themselves. Yet another argument 
underlining the present research is that the phenomenon of ‘multiple’ or ‘plural’ identities was not 
an imperial development, as is sometimes implied by the growing body of scholarly literature 
focused on imperial period. Our analysis of pre- and post-Social War Italy will strive towards 
pointing out the similar practice of social, legal and cultural manoeuvring as well as multiplicity of 
coexistent identities that could be employed depending on circumstance. In the same vein, a closer 
look at the second century provincial situation will offer a fruitful comparative angle by which the 
difference between the Republican and Imperial periods may prove to be fairly less pronounced.  
The initial part of this thesis will be dedicated to detailed investigation into the divisions of Roman 
law (ius civile, ius honorarium, ius gentium), as it is deemed beneficial in determining availability 
and flexibility of Roman legal institutions. By looking at theoretical and practical bounds of Roman 
law, the present research will survey what parts of it were available to non-citizens; what parts were 
considered to be exclusively Roman; and what possibly stood behind such division. Secondly, the 
concept of Roman citizenship will be addressed in the light of incoherent evidence pointing to, on 
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the one hand, increasing extension of Roman citizenship and the fluidity in determining one’s 
civitas (Gaius Inst. 71; 74, cf. Gnomon 46, 47) and, on the other, continuous protection of Roman 
citizenship as an exclusive legal status (Gnomon 39, 49-53). Finally, the question of identity will be 
attended to, as the final part of the research will aim at investigating the role that Roman law and 
citizenship played in constructing, (re-)shaping and perceiving the Roman vis-à-vis local (regional) 
identities. The relationship between one’s legal, civic and personal (cultural) identities will be 
looked at, and the extent to which the former two came to influence or reflect the latter. 
Simultaneously, the survey into Roman literary and juristic sources juxtaposed to provincial 
documentary record is expected to add colour to the notion of Roman ‘legalistic cast of mind’,11 i.e. 
the Roman understanding of law and order as crucial to their identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Kantor (2012), 56. 
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1. Roman law 
 
Introduction  
 
We read in Gaius’ (b. ca. 110 CE) Institutes, an ‘elementary’ textbook on Roman law originating in 
the 2nd century CE (c. 170) that ‘all people who are ruled by laws and customs partly make use of 
their own laws, and partly have recourse to those which are common to all men’ (Inst. 1.1).12 In 
other words, Gaius distinguishes between the ‘civil’ or ‘citizen law’ (ius civile) and the ‘law of 
nations’ (ius gentium). The former was pertinent to ‘what every people established as law for itself’ 
thus being ‘peculiar’ to that one nation only (quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius 
proprium est), while the latter was ‘what natural reason established among all men’ (quod vero 
naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit), or law which is observed and employed by all 
peoples alike. Thus, Gaius repeats, ‘the Roman people partly make use of their own law, and partly 
avail themselves of that common to all men’. 
In Gaius’ description, the ius gentium is not perceived as part of the Roman law, but rather as one 
existing outside of it, or in addition to it. In this, his definition of the ius gentium seems closer to 
that of the ius naturale, or ‘natural law’, common to all living beings (quod natura omnia animalia 
docuit, Ulpian D. 1.1.3).13 The ius naturale was, nevertheless, perceived as a separate body of law, 
which could be added to the ius civile and ius gentium, thus forming ‘yet another instance of the 
widespread fondness for the number three in the Roman law’.14 The trichotomy of ius civile, 
gentium and naturale, Kaser suggests, was rather commonly used by the so-called ‘school’ jurists of 
the classical, as well as later periods.15 Meanwhile, another ius was added by the jurists alongside 
the ius civile and ius gentium, as the latter continued to be used synonymously with the ius naturale. 
This ‘new’ branch of law was called ius honorarium, or the law of the magistrates.   
In what follows, the latter division (civile – gentium – honorarium) will be employed, as the main 
part of the chapter will seek to highlight the most important implications of and differences between 
the three types of law used by the Romans, as well as investigate the theoretical bounds and 
availability of their legal institutions. Furthermore, the main types of Roman legal enactments will 
                                                          
12 The Latin text and the English translation of Gaius’ Institutes are taken from the edition of de Zulueta (1946). 
13 Cf. Gaius Inst. 1.1: quod naturalis ratio … constituit. The Latin text and the English translation of the Digest are 
taken from Mommsen, Krueger & Watson (1985).  
14 Goudy (1910), referred to by Schiller (1978), 560. Cf. Ulpian in D. 1.1.4: ‘manumissions, also, are within the ius 
gentium … this matter had its origin in the ius gentium because by ius naturale all were born free … but after slavery 
appeared in the ius gentium, the relief of manumission followed … there began to be three types in the ius gentium: free 
men … slaves, and the class of freedmen’ etc.  
15 Kaser (1975), 63. 
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be briefly discussed in terms of their application and extension to non-citizens. Lastly, due attention 
will be paid to several aspects of Roman legal administration, both at Rome and in its periphery.  
 
1.1 Divisions of Roman law: exclusivity and accessibility to non-Romans 
a. ius civile16 
 
Ulpian (b. c. 170 CE), writing some 30 years later than Gaius, gives his own interpretation of the ius 
civile in relation to the ius gentium: ‘ius civile is that which is not wholly apart from (ius) naturale 
or (ius) gentium, nor subordinate to it throughout’ (D. 1.1.6 pr). ‘Accordingly’, Ulpian explains, 
‘when we add or subtract something from the ius commune (common law), we establish our own 
law, that is, the ius civile’. In Ulpian’s understanding, Roman civil law was, generally speaking, 
part of the law common to all people (ius gentium, naturale or commune), for it was created by 
adopting some of the provisions and institutions of the ‘common law’ as well as building upon 
them. The eventual differences between the ‘citizen law’ and the ‘law of nations’ were what made 
the former peculiar to the Roman state.   
Consequently, the Roman ius civile was a body of laws that, normally, applied exclusively to the 
Roman citizenry, and was meant to be used in settling disputes between Roman citizens only.17 By 
making use of institutions and actions of the ius civile available to them, the citizens were 
empowered ‘to make things happen in law by uttering the right words’.18 The ‘citizen law’ was thus 
primarily meant to guarantee every citizen his or her rights (of property, ownership, inheritance 
etc.) as well as enforce the obligations that went along with those rights:    
These were the realities of how people related to each other, the security derived from 
possessing with proper legal title a home, land and money, and the expectations a 
business partner could have of a colleague, or a tenant of a landlord. They were integral 
to what it meant to be a Roman citizen.19 
 
Indeed, aside from ensuring one’s individual rights and obligations, the ius civile played a public 
role of considerable importance too: it was perceived as a defining feature of community where 
                                                          
16 Crook (1967) notes the multiple significations of the term ius civile: the expression may be used for the law of Rome 
in its entirety, or in opposition to ius publicum, i.e. the law of constitution and administration (i), ius honorarium (ii), 
and ius gentium (iii), 293. In this chapter, the term ius civile will be used in relation with and in opposition to both ius 
honorarium and ius gentium.  
17 Cf. Schiller (1978) on ius civile as comprising ‘the norms which were exclusively applicable to Roman citizens and to 
them alone, whether these rules stemmed from customary practices, from statutes, or from juristic interpretation’, 525. 
Such cases involving the citizens were normally adjudicated by the urban praetor. 
18 Harries (2006) on the perception of Cn. Flavius’ collection of legis actiones (legal procedures or ‘actions in law’) in 
the late fourth century BCE, as a form of ius civile, 41. 
19 Harries (2006), 15; see also Gardner (1993).  
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every component was expected to abide the rules if he or she was to live within it. As Harries points 
out in her analysis of Cicero’s contribution to the creation of such a concept, ‘Cicero’s Crassus’ 
view of the law code as comprising all that citizens required of law did not fit the facts but was a 
powerful expression of the perceived supremacy of the Twelve Tables as citizen-law’.20 Cicero’s 
Crassus may also be taken as representative of the pride that Romans, especially of senatorial order, 
took in their ius civile, as he argues for the supremacy of Roman ‘citizen law’ to any other:  
You will win from legal studies this further joy, interest and delight that you will most 
readily understand how far our ancestors surpassed in practical wisdom studies the men 
of other nations, if you compare our own laws with those of Lycurgus, Draco and Solon, 
among the foreigners. For it is incredible how disordered, and wellnigh absurd, is all 
national law (ius civile) other than our own; on which subject it is my habit to say a great 
deal in everyday talk, when upholding the wisdom of our own folk against that of all 
others, the Greeks in particular,21 
 
Similar sense of pride and awareness of the distinctive features of the Roman ius civile is evident in 
Roman juristic writing too. For instance, in the first book of his Institutes alone, Gaius notes on 
patria potestas (1.55), the manus authority (1.108), and mancipatio (1.119) as being ius proprium 
civium Romanorum.22 Especially telling is 1.55 where Gaius notes on paternal authority in Roman 
law in relation to other nations:  
This right is peculiar to Roman citizens; for scarcely any other men have over their sons 
a power such as we have. The late emperor Hadrian declared as much in the edict he 
issued concerning those who petitioned him for citizenship for themselves and their 
children. I am not forgetting that the Galatians regard children as being in the potestas 
of their parents.23 
 
This passage of Gaius primarily demonstrates the Roman awareness of differences and similarities 
between their own ‘national law’ and laws observed by other nations. Although both manus and 
potestas institutions had seemingly existed among the Germanic tribes too, in his edict Hadrian was 
most likely referring to the singularity of the Roman patria potestas institution among the 
                                                          
20 Harries (2006), 185 on the Twelve Tables being envisioned as ‘encapsulating the full legal implications of citizen 
identity’ in Cicero’s De Oratore.   
21 Percipietis etiam illam ex cognitione iuris laetitiam et voluptatem, quod, quantum praestiterint nostri maiores 
prudentia ceteris gentibus, tum facillime intellegetis, si cum illorum Lycurgo et Dracone et Solone nostras leges 
conferre volueritis; incredibile est enim, quam sit omne ius civile praeter hoc nostrum inconditum ac paene ridiculum; 
de quo multa soleo in sermonibus cotidianis dicere, cum hominum nostrorum prudentiam ceteris omnibus et maxime 
Graecis antepono, de Orat. 1.197. Translation by Sutton & Rackham (1942). 
22 Law peculiar to Roman citizens.  
23 Quod ius proprium civium Romanorum est (fere enim nulli alii sunt homines, qui talem in filios suos habent 
potestatem, qualem nos habemus) idque divi Hadriani edicto, quod proposuit de his, qui sibi liberisque suis ab eo 
civitatem Romanam petebant, significatur. Nec me praeterit Galatarum gentem credere in potestate parentum liberos 
esse, Inst. 1.55.  
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Mediterranean peoples.24 Gaius, although acknowledging its observance by the Galatians, 
nevertheless introduces this right as ius proprium Romanorum, and brings the edict of Hadrian as 
evidence in support of his claim. More importantly still, the given passage illustrates the close link 
between Roman citizenship (civitas Romana) and specifically Roman legal institutions. Powers 
such as patria potestas may easily be seen as a means by which the Romans could claim their 
distinctiveness from other peoples.25 In the second century CE, Hadrian must have still seen patria 
potestas as an inherent quality of Roman citizenship, if he had used this ‘peculiarly Roman’ 
institution when describing citizenship for petitioners in his edict referred to by Gaius.26 
Furthermore, Gaughan notes on the fact that in Gaius’ description of patria potestas institution, the 
emphasis lies on how this power sets a Roman apart from non-Romans, instead of a father from the 
rest of the family.27  
Yet another interesting case of similar sort is Gaius’ discussion of verbal obligation in Inst. 3.92-93, 
where he claims that sponsio, or an obligation contracted by words ‘dari spondes? - spondeo’ is 
peculiar to the Roman ius civile.28 The other expressions, Gaius maintains, in whatever language 
they be uttered, belong to the ‘law of nations’ and are therefore valid among non-Romans too, so 
long as both parties understand what they stipulate.29 However, the sponsio clause, says Gaius, is so 
peculiar to the Roman citizens (adeo propria ciuium Romanorum est) that it cannot be properly 
rendered into the Greek language. Noteworthy here is both the importance of mutual understanding, 
and the impossibility of rendering a certain verbal expression into another language serving as a 
marker of its specificity to the Roman ius civile.30         
In addition to ‘citizen law’, there was also another, more specialized meaning of the ius civile, 
namely that of the body of rules developed through jurists’ interpretation of law. These juristic 
interpretations would acquire the force of law themselves and be perceived as one of the sources of 
                                                          
24 Muirhead (2009), 29 (n. 28). We read in Caesar’s account of the Gallic wars about the same vitae necisque potestas 
observed by the Gauls, as he writes that ‘men have the power of life and death over their wives, just as they have over 
their children’ (viri in uxores, sicuti in liberos, vitae necisque habent potestatem, BG 6.19).  
25 Gaughan (2010), 26. 
26 ‘... though the father’s potestas does not describe citizenship in a direct legal sense, it is a means of identifying and 
distinguishing the Roman citizen male’, ibid. 
27 Gaughan supports her idea by observing that the term pater is more often used to define ‘Roman-ness’ than ‘father-
ness’; and that various examples of its use tend to illustrate the close relationship between family and civitas, ibid. 25. 
28 ‘Do you solemnly agree to give?’ ‘I do solemnly agree to give’.  
29 ‘And even if they [question and answer of a verbal obligation] are uttered in the Greek language they are still valid, 
so far as Roman citizens are concerned, if they understand Greek; and on the other hand, although they may be stated in 
Latin, they will, nevertheless, be binding on foreigners, provided they are familiar with the Latin language’.  
30 In the so-called Transylvannian Tablets (139-167 CE), provincial documentary evidence from Dacia roughly 
contemporary to the writings of Gaius, we witness non-Romans making use of Latin stipulation clauses, although in 
their ‘degenerated form’, see Polay (1980) and van Oven (1958).   
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law (Inst. 1.2). Both the broad and the specialized meanings, according to Harries, contributed to 
the construct of the ius civile, it being part of the ‘philosophical, and also emotive, entity: law’.31  
b. ius gentium    
 
Contrary to the ius civile which governed legal relations between Roman citizens only, the concept 
of the ius gentium (‘law of nations’ or simply ‘peoples’ law’), broadly speaking, determined 
Rome’s relationship to the legal customs of non-Roman peoples. The ius gentium, in theory, 
consisted of ‘those legal customs accepted by the Roman law as applying to, and being used by, all 
the people they met, whether Roman citizens or not’.32 In other words, it was the body of laws, 
applicable to foreigners both in their dealings between themselves, and in those involving Roman 
citizens.33 The jurisdiction over such cases was largely in the hands of the praetor peregrinus.  
Although the concept of the ius gentium stretches back to at least 200 BCE as it was largely defined 
by Rome’s territorial expansion and the growing set of complex relations with foreign peoples, the 
term ius gentium first appears in Cicero and is already used in several senses.34 In his De Officiis 
Cicero distinguishes between the ius civile and ius gentium, and explains what the relationship 
between the two should be:  
our ancestors chose to understand that the ius gentium was one thing, the ius civile quite 
another; that which is (ius) civile is not necessarily (ius) gentium, but that which is (ius) 
gentium ought to be (ius) civile’,35 
 
The jurists seemingly adopt both theoretical and practical views, and the dualistic interpretation of 
the ius gentium persists: on the one hand, it is perceived as ‘natural reason’ and thus the oldest of 
laws; on the other, it is understood simply as the body of law which developed together with the 
city-state Rome turning into an Empire.36 Whatever the correct answer may be (perhaps the two 
                                                          
31 Harries (2006), 185.  
32 Crook (1967), 29. 
33 Crook provides a simple example of the difference between the two: slavery was held to be iure gentium, in the sense 
that all (most) nations have it; while sponsio, as a specifically Roman form of verbal contract, was iure civili and, 
therefore, available only to Roman citizens. Another example comes from the law of status: children of a valid Roman 
contractual marriage (iustae nuptiae) followed the status of a father according to the ius civile; while in any other type 
of marriage (iure gentium), the status of a mother. Therefore, children of a Roman citizen woman and a slave or an 
unknown father became Roman citizens according to the ius gentium, while children of Roman citizen fathers and non-
Roman mothers may not have become citizens at all, or may even have become slaves according to the same principle 
of following the maternal line, Crook (1967), 40-1. 
34 Namely, as the law applicable to Roman dealings with foreigners, and the ‘oldest of laws’ based on ‘natural reason’. 
Schiller (1978), 550.  
35 Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem 
gentium, idem civile esse debet, De Offic. 3.17.69. Translation by Schiller (1978). 
36 Cf. Gaius in D. 41.1.1 pr. and Papinian in D. 48.5.39.2. Schiller (1978) summarizes the endless scholarly debate over 
which interpretation came first only to conclude that it is still ‘not clear if the theoretical sense of the term is a later 
development or if it preceded the practical one’, 551. 
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interpretations coexisted as they are not opposing to one another in any strict sense), the ius gentium 
was still, generally speaking, part of the Roman law. Indeed, the specific transactions attributed to 
the newly created body of the ius gentium ‘were Roman in nature, a creation of Roman courts, 
perhaps with the aid of Roman jurists’.37  
Particularly telling in this respect is the passage in Marcianus (early 3rd century CE) which 
describes the rights to legal procedures and transactions retained by a person who had lost his 
citizenship upon deportation:  
a person deported loses his citizenship, he retains his freedom; is excluded from the ius 
civile but may use the ius gentium. Accordingly, he may buy and sell, lease and hire, 
exchange, lend at interest, and other similar things.38 
 
A person reduced to peregrinity, thus, was nevertheless allowed to employ the institutions of the ius 
gentium, just as any other non-Roman would be. From Marcianus’ description we see rather clearly 
that the institutions of the ius gentium were primarily meant to govern commercial transactions 
between Roman citizens and foreigners. This notion subscribes to the idea that satisfying the needs 
of commercial relations between Romans and peregrines was the main reason behind the 
development of certain legal institutions in addition to those of the ius civile. What had previously 
been established by various commercial treaties between Rome and foreign states (or by extension 
of the ius commercium), was replaced by more flexible legal institutions of the ius gentium over the 
course of the 2nd century BCE.39 Gradually, series of other institutions and transactions, e.g. 
traditio, occupatio and manumissio that were not considered to be peculiar to the Roman ‘citizen 
law’, were added to the ius gentium based on the notion that they had counterparts in other legal 
systems too, which automatically made them ‘common’ to all men.40 Some of the institutions of the 
ius civile, such as the aforementioned stipulatio, were first of all adapted to the use of foreigners, 
and only later included among those of the ius gentium.41  
Some legal powers and principles, as we have already observed, were thought to be more ‘Roman’ 
than the others. The institutions which a foreigner (or a person reduced to peregrinity) would be 
barred from largely belonged to the realm of private law. For instance, non-Romans could only 
make use of limited ius commercii, which meant that the property could be transferred between 
them and Roman citizens and they could make legally binding contracts, but they could not 
                                                          
37 Schiller (1978), 527. Schiller maintains that the very term ius gentium was never used by the Republican jurists to 
refer to those parts of Roman law which applied to peregrines, so it is not entirely clear why they were added to the 
realm of the ‘law of nations’ by later jurists. 
38 D. 48.22.15. 
39 Schiller (1978), 527. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 528.  
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mancipate (transfer property by mancipatio), as they were not entitled to full legal ownership of a 
res mancipi (Gaius Inst. 1.119).42 Furthermore, peregrines were only exceptionally entitled to 
possess conubium, or the right to contract a valid Roman law marriage, which meant that most of 
the family law, including the law of inheritance, was not accessible to them and thus complicated 
the possibility of (legally beneficial) personal relations between peregrines and Romans.43 The 
acquisition of Roman citizenship would therefore ‘not only affect for them those existing dealings 
with Romans which were open to foreigners, but would allow them to enter into personal and 
property relations with Roman citizens’.44   
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Roman jurists were primarily writing for the Roman public 
and aimed at interpreting legal conundrums originating within the Roman citizen community; they 
hardly ever mentioned peregrine ways if not in contrast to the Roman ones.45 The development of 
the ius gentium institutions was thus merely a response to Rome’s intensified contact with foreign 
states. The growing flexibility and adaptation of rigid forms of the ius civile, and, especially, their 
extension to foreigners, were all part of the process of expanding the boundaries of legal relations.  
c. ius honorarium  
 
Yet another development of Roman law aiming at flexibility and appropriation of the Roman ius 
civile resulted in the emergence of the so-called ‘honorary law’ or ‘law of the magistrates’ (ius 
honorarium), also referred to as the ius praetorium, or the ‘law of the praetors’. When Gaius singles 
out all of the sources constituting Roman civil law in his Institutes, he mentions edicts of the 
magistrates among the rest.46 Comparably, Papinian (b. 142 CE), one of the most celebrated jurists 
of the classical period of Roman law and the contemporary of Gaius, gives his own account of the 
sources of Roman ius civile:   
The civil law is the law which is derived from statutes, plebiscites, decrees of the senate, 
enactments of the emperors, or the authority of those learned in the law. Praetorian law 
is that which was introduced by the praetors in order to aid, supplement, or amend the 
                                                          
42 Res mancipi were goods such as land (ager Romanus) and rights over it, slaves, four-footed animals etc. Some 
peoples (cities, city-states) may have been entitled to full ius commercium, e.g. Latins and some of the allies in the 
Republican period.  
43 Cf. Gardner (1993), 187.  
44 Ibid. 188. Schiller (1978) points out that the ethical nature assumed by the ius gentium in late classical times 
eventually led to the inclusion of some matters of the law of persons and family law within the category of the ius 
gentium, so that it was no longer perceived as governing commercial relations with peregrines only, 529. 
45 Gardner (1993). Cf. Gaius Inst. 2.40. 
46 Constant autem iura populi Romani ex legibus, plebiscitis, senatus consultis, constitutionibus principum, edictis 
eorum, qui ius edicendi habent, responsis prudentium, Inst. 1.2 Cf. differences with Cicero Top. 28. Harries (2006) 
maintains that ‘Cicero’s list of the partes of law reveals both the lack of homogeneity of that entity labelled ‘Roman 
law’ and its contested nature’, 69.  
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civil law, with a view to the public advantage. The same is also called ‘honorary law’ 
after the honor (public office) of the praetors.47 
 
Papinian, contrary to Gaius, chose not to include edicts of the magistrates among the sources of the 
ius civile. Instead, ius praetorium or ius honorarium is perceived by him as a distinct body of law, 
with a clear purpose of supplementing or otherwise correcting the ius civile, for the sake of public 
benefit.48 This formal separation of the ius civile and ius honorarium was called the most significant 
dichotomy in the private law and procedure of the classical epoch by Schiller.49 Papinian’s 
definition of the sources of law, originating only slightly later than that of Gaius’, thus points to the 
rapidly growing relevance of magistrates with ius edicendi.  
Marcianus, writing after the death of Septimius Severus (d. 211 CE), provides a kind of 
combination of Gaius’ and Papinian’s views. Instead of describing the two (ius civile and ius 
honorarium) as separate bodies of law, Marcianus perceives ius honorarium as an inherent part of 
the ius civile, merely aimed at fulfilling the practical needs of the population, as he maintains:  
Honorary law itself is the living voice of the civil law.50 
 
It is in these developments that we are able to discern a certain evolution both of Roman law itself 
and of its perception: old and rigid principles and practices of the ius civile had to be adjusted to the 
needs of the ever-growing Roman state. The urban (from 367 BCE) and the peregrine praetors 
(added in 241 BCE), who were in charge of the Republican courts, primarily had to work with the 
system of law based on the Twelve Tables or, as Crook puts it, ‘standard and rigid forms of 
procedure and ancient custom’.51 Since the praetors had no legislative power and were therefore 
unable to change the obsolete or no longer relevant law, they started building up more flexible 
institutions alongside those of the ius civile and authorizing them with their annual edict, thus 
‘enabling the law of the Republic to keep up pace with its economic and social development’.52  
The edict of a praetor would set out the actions of law allowed throughout his year in office. 
Although praetor’s edict was to be valid during the year of his office only, the contents of the 
annual edict to a large extent remained stable, as they were normally adopted by the next praetor 
with very little or no change at all. The possibility of annual change did, nevertheless, invite legal 
                                                          
47 Ius autem civile est, quod ex legibus, plebis scitis, senatus consultis, decretis principum, auctoritate prudentium venit. 
Ius praetorium est, quod praetores introduxerunt adiuvandi vel supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis gratia propter 
utilitatem publicam. quod et honorarium dicitur ad honorem praetorum sic nominatum, D. 1.1.7. 
48 Cf. also Gaius’ Inst. 3.41: Qua de causa postea praetoris edicto haec iuris iniquitas emendata est (‘this injustice of 
the law was afterwards corrected by the edict of the praetor’).  
49 Schiller (1978), 531. 
50 Ipsum ius honorarium viva vox est iuris civilis, D. 1.1.8.  
51 Crook (1967), 24. 
52 Ibid.  
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innovation, given that the new praetor was willing and, more importantly, competent to initiate 
modifications.53 Thus, Kantor maintains, ‘it was through the medium of the praetor’s edict that 
Roman private law between the Aebutian law [originating in the early second century BCE] and 
Hadrian’s reign mainly developed’, as the praetors’ edicts gradually became ‘no less permanent 
than legislation itself’.54   
Nevertheless, Crook holds that the ius civile remained superior to the ius honorarium in case of a 
conflict between the two, as he writes: ‘the remedies and protection he [the praetor] gave were in 
effect legal rights as against all the world except a superior magistrate or someone claiming under 
legislation or the civil law’.55 Similarly, Grosso stressed that while ius honorarium was a welcome 
elaboration of the ‘citizen law’, ius civile continued to occupy the central place in the legal life of 
Rome.56 Schiller seems to at least partially support this notion as he holds that ‘in every phase of the 
law there was an antithesis between law in the strict sense and the law created by the magistrate’.57 
The latter, being more progressive and versatile, could be and was perceived by some as a new legal 
system fashioned to complement if not oppose the old one – a similar view is conveyed by 
Papinian’s definition mentioned above. In practice, however, as well as in some of the jurists’ 
opinion (cf. Marcianus D. 1.1.8) the two systems of law were closely related and the differences 
between them were less pronounced. In the spheres of ownership and inheritance, however, the 
institutions of the two remained sharply opposed.58  
With the rise of the imperial regime, yet another body of law started to form, namely that deriving 
from the activity of an emperor and his delegate judges. It received the designation of ius novum 
(‘new law’) or ius extra ordinem (‘law outside regular jurisdiction’) as it worked outside the spheres 
of the ius civile and the ius honorarium, with judicial proceedings taking place in the newly 
established tribunals of the emperor and his officials.59 The shortcomings of both ius gentium and 
ius honorarium were thus amended by a new judicial process (cognitio extra ordinem) which 
‘reflected imperial policy, first in the field of succession, thereafter in the law of persons and of 
                                                          
53 Noteworthy here is the notion that praetors, while being responsible for courts, were not necessarily learned in law, 
which was the primary reason for their reluctance to alternate the work of their more learned predecessors. 
54 Kantor (2012), 76-77. Some time around the year 129 CE, the annual modification of the praetor’s edict was 
restricted by Hadrian (r. 117–138), as the jurist Salvius Julianus was commissioned to make a formal revision of the 
praetor’s edict which resulted in a consolidated and fairly fixed version (edictum perpetuum), subject only to changes 
approved by the Emperor.  
55 Crook (1967), 24. 
56 Grosso (1967), 71-79.  
57 Schiller (1978), 532. Cf. Kantor (2012): ‘Sabinus and Gaius commented on the institutions of ius civile in the sense of 
statutory law as opposed to rules of the praetor’s edict’, 64.  
58 Schiller (1978), 532. 
59 Ibid. 534.  
16 
 
obligations’.60 The development of ius novum points not only to the need of legal innovation, but 
also to the growing degree of imperial intervention into the matters of private law.61 Personal law, 
which governed matters of family law, inheritance and succession was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
most conservative and, accordingly, the most exclusive part of the Roman private law. 
Nevertheless, as we shall later on see, the same principle of exclusivity of personal law applied to 
other legal systems too, as demonstrated by the livelihood of local legal practices in this particular 
sphere of law, and their retention even after the Constitutio Anotininiana of 212 CE.  
 
1.2 Legal enactments and their application 
 
As for the legal enactments by which law was made, Gaius distinguished between the following: 
laws (leges), plebiscites, senatusconsulta, imperial constitutions, edicts of the magistrates, and 
jurists’ responses (Inst. 1.2).62 The main features of the most important of these enactments and 
their applicability has been sufficiently expounded by Crook and may only be briefly summarized 
here.63 Leges, as the main source for Roman civil law, applied exclusively to Roman citizens. 
Furthermore, Crook notes, since leges largely determined the law applied in the Roman courts, they 
would normally be seen as overriding one’s claim based on non-citizen law.64 The plebiscites were 
decisions enacted by the plebeians, which became binding on all citizens after 286 BCE, and were 
primarily relating to matters of private law.65 The senatusconsulta during the Republican period 
were merely opinions or advice of the Senate which could at a later stage be turned into law by a 
                                                          
60 Ibid. 535. Cf. D. 5.3.1.3; D. 47.19.3. 
61 Starting already with Augustus’ moral legislation (Leges Iuliae of 18-17 BCE) on marriage, inheritance, and 
succession. It suffices here to only briefly mention that the private law (ius privatum), in opposition to the ius publicum 
which governed the interests of the state, determined legal relations between private individuals. While the majority of 
Roman jurists seem to have mostly been occupied with private law matters, Kantor (2012) alerts us that such limitations 
were never adopted in legal administration: Pliny asked Trajan on private law (not only Roman) as well as on criminal, 
public, religious law (Ep. 10.65, 10.79, 10.31, 10.49, 10.68), p. 64. Furthermore, he maintains, there was no ‘real 
separation of the sphere of private law as living by its own ‘legal’ rules’ at least to the beginning of the 3rd century CE.     
62 Kantor (2012) draws attention to the problem of terminology: those were formal (and linguistic) rather than content-
related distinctions, as they were made according to the body passing the rule; the only type of imperial constitution 
distinguished by its contents was a decretum – decision in a law-suit, 70. He also notes that ‘the difference between 
state and non-state rules was far less pronounced on a terminological level than is the case in the modern period’, ibid. 
83. 
63 See also Crawford (1996), Crook (1994).   
64 Crook (1967) gives an example: a non-citizen’s claim that, according to his law, he could inherit from a Roman 
citizen would not be valid in the Roman court because such type of inheritance was against Roman civil law, 30.   
65 Alexander (2006), 240. 
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Roman magistrate with legislative power. These opinions seemingly acquired the force of law under 
the Empire and could at times extend the application of leges to non-citizens.66                   
While edicta, as mentioned above, were technically only valid for the time of one’s magistracy and 
were thus relatively open to legal innovation, they would usually be adopted by the next person in 
office with very little change. The provincial edict would determine legal relations not only between 
the Roman citizens residing in the province but also among the peregrines, as Cicero’s letter to 
Atticus (c. 50 BCE) concerning his own role as a governor of Cilicia and his provincial edict reads: 
… in many matters I have followed Scaevola, amongst them that one which the Greeks 
consider the grant of liberty to them, namely, that controversies amongst themselves be 
tried under their own laws.67 
 
Many of the provisions of local law thus got their way into what was understood as Roman 
‘provincial law’ through the leniency of the edicts of provincial governors.68 Most of the imperial 
constitutions were applicable only to specific provinces or sets of people therein, for instance, the 
Christians. Imperial decisions (decreta, edicta, rescripta), on the other hand, could apply to 
everybody as ‘they were not constitutionally confined’ to the imperial provinces, nor to Roman 
citizens in particular.69  
Bearing in mind the wide range of legal enactments and their applicability, it may come as little 
surprise that certain difficulties would inevitably arise regarding the application and validity of 
certain legislation, as well as the superiority of one legal enactment over another. While acting as a 
governor of the province of Bithynia-Pontus, Pliny seemingly had frequent doubts about the 
application of various laws and ordinances, as he would often turn to Trajan for legal advice: 
‘numerous imperial constitutions have been quoted to me about this <…> none, however, applies 
either specifically to this province or to all areas generally’ (10.65), to which complaint Trajan 
would reply acknowledging that there are many enactments, but no general ordinance for Bithynia, 
and would nevertheless seek to provide Pliny with a suitable solution (10.66).70 
Documentary evidence from mid-second century Egypt confirms the regularity of doubt in 
application of (imperial) ordinances too: in BGU 1.19 (135 CE) concerning the restitution of a share 
                                                          
66 Crook (1967), 31. Cf. Gaius’ Inst. 1.47: ‘it should be noted that, as it is provided by the Lex Ælia Sentia that slaves 
who have been manumitted for the purpose of defrauding a patron, or creditors, do not become free; for the Senate, at 
the suggestion of the Divine Hadrian, decreed that this rule should also apply to foreigners, while the other provisions of 
the same law do not apply to them’. See also Alexander (2006), 240. 
67 multaque sum secutus Scaevolae, in iis illud in quo sibi libertatem censent Graeci datam, ut Graeci inter se 
disceptent suis legibus, Att. 6.1.15. Translation by Schiller (1978), adapted. 
68 Schönbauer (1937), who coined the term Provinzialrecht to define a kind of law emerging in the context of 
interaction between the Empire and local laws, held that Roman courts continued to make use of local legal provisions 
as part of ‘provincial law’ even after the Constitutio Antoniniana, 309, 351-353. 
69 Crook (1967:31) with reference to FIRA 1.68, 1.73. 
70 In qua ego auditis constitutionibus principum, quia nihil inveniebam aut proprium aut universale, quod ad Bithynos 
referretur, consulendum te existimavi, quid observari velles, 10.65.2. See also Ep. 10.72-73, 10.79.  
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left by a grandmother, an Egyptian plaintiff refers to an edict issued by Hadrian which established 
the right of succession in favour of grandchildren. The judge, nevertheless, has doubts about the 
interpretation of the enactment and asks the prefect whether it also applies to Egyptians. The prefect 
answers affirmatively and confirms that the legal share should be adjudged to the plaintiff.71 One 
gathers from these examples an idea that the application of an (imperial) ordinance could either be 
universal or restricted to specific components of a given society. Furthermore, one may safely 
assume that the least (legally and socially) privileged strata of provincials would often find 
themselves in the middle of such interpretative problems.   
Roman civil law of Late Republican and Early Imperial period thus evidently lacked not only the 
clarity in defining what constitutes sources of law,72 but also a clear hierarchy of legislation: ‘while 
the old forms of legislation persisted, this created a situation in which laws of the Roman people, 
decrees of the Senate, and personal decisions of the emperor were all on the same level’.73 
Similarly, there does not seem to have been any procedural distinction established between passing 
temporary and permanent rules throughout the periods in question.74 Despite the absence of a clean-
cut hierarchical system of legislation or attempts to distinguish one type of legal enactment from 
another, we do nevertheless find ‘a clear idea of binding rules’ in both Hellenistic and Roman legal 
systems.75 Furthermore, there seems to have been a clear hierarchy of authority, particularly evident 
from the willingness of provincial judges to consult governors over uncertain applicability of 
enactments, and from governors’ further consultations with the higher judicial authorities back at 
Rome.     
 
1.3 Administration of justice  
 
Turning to those in whose hands the application of legislative acts lied, it is important to establish 
that ‘the degree of discretion which Roman magistrates had in applying or not applying the law was 
much wider than any modern understanding of the ‘rule of law’ would allow’.76 This meant that, in 
                                                          
71 Taubenschlag (1951), 127.  
72 Cf. different lists in Gaius’ Inst. 1.2 and Cicero’s Topica 28. Reinhardt (2003) notes on the possible reason behind the 
differing viewpoints of the two authors: while Gaius was a teacher in a law-school, Cicero was a practicing advocate.  
73 Kantor (2012), 72. In the imperial period, notably, neither of the first two could have contradicted emperor’s wishes.  
74 Ibid. 77.  
75 Skoda (2012), 39. 
76 Kantor (2012), 78. Kantor also notes that in some respects the discretion decreased, e.g. in 67 BCE praetors were 
forbidden to change their edict after its publication by Cornelian law (Dio Cass. 36.40.1), while in other respects it 
grew, e.g. through the development of cognitio procedure in capital cases, very wide discretion was allowed to 
presiding magistrates entitled to make their own enquiries and not bound by complex procedural rules of late republican 
jury courts, ibid., with reference to Kaser (1966), 339-409.   
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practice, the Roman magistrates and provincial governors were relatively free to independently 
promulgate and administer various rules of law which would remain legally binding as long as there 
was no direct intervention of a higher authority, namely the Senate or the Emperor.77 Similarly to 
the process of new institutions of ius honorarium getting round the obsolete provisions of ius civile 
without abrogating them; Roman legal authorities, such as the Senate, felt free to make exceptions 
and consider each case separately, although formally acknowledging previous practice and the rules 
which were applied in the past.78 Provincial administration of justice, above all, was wont to employ 
the case-by-case method for dispute settlement, especially if there were more than one set of laws 
involved (see Ch. 3.3 below).  
As mentioned above, the hierarchy of authority was a significant factor in the distribution of legal 
remedies. The governor, together with other high officials of his entourage, was perceived as the 
highest legal authority not only by the provincials, but also by Roman citizens resident in the 
province. Lower courts and regional judges would report cases beyond their jurisdiction to the 
governor, and it was in his hands to either grant or refuse further investigation. The overindulgence 
of such power on behalf of Roman high officials would inevitably occur in various parts of the 
Empire, so that not only provincials but Romans too would often find themselves in need of the 
protection of Roman law against governors’ abuses.79 The provincials would often seek further help 
by addressing the Senatorial or the Emperor’s court as the highest judicial authorities Empire-wide, 
by means of petition or personal audience in Rome. While one’s chances to successfully pass a 
petition to Rome hinged upon the benevolence of the governor, one’s ability to secure a personal 
hearing of his case in front of the Senate or the Emperor lied in his financial capacity to afford such 
a long and costly affair. Naturally, the main incentive to go through with any of these procedures 
was the awareness that once your case was adjudicated by the highest judicial authority, its decision 
may no longer be appealed.80 The governors, too, often sought the emperor’s rulings as they would 
remain legally binding even after the end of their office in the province: thus, ‘the emperor was 
addressed not only as a legislator, but also as an interpreter of existing law’.81  
                                                          
77 Ibid. 78.  
78 For an example of Senate’s discretion, Kantor (2012) refers his reader to Tacitus’ Ann. 3.60-63.  
79 ‘The Roman abroad was … at risk not only from non-Romans but also from Romans, whose behavior in the 
provinces might not be restrained by the norms that held sway at Rome, particularly where those Romans held positions 
of power’, Braund (1998), 12. Numerous leges de repetundis (on the right to recovery of officially extorted property) 
have been passed since the Lex Calpurnia of 149 BCE, e.g. Lex Acilia (123/2 BCE), Lex Servilia Glauca (c. 100 BCE), 
Lex Cornelia (81 BCE). 
80 It became a res iudicata, which may have been used as a point of reference in further cases of similar sort.  
81 Kantor (2012), 64. Cf. multitude of letters from Pliny to Trajan regarding private, public and criminal (both Roman 
and local) law matters. Kantor calls Pliny’s correspondence with Trajan ‘one of the most important sources of law in 
provincial litigation’, ibid. 76. 
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Indeed, governors of the provinces were meant both to provide all the inhabitants of their particular 
province with applicable rules of law, and to make specifically Roman legal remedies available to 
Roman citizens residing in the province. In the aforementioned letter to Atticus regarding his 
provincial edict, Cicero, having claimed he would leave legal autonomy to the Greeks, goes on to 
explain some further provisions:  
The edict is short because of my way of dividing it, for I thought of issuing edicts under 
two heads (genus). One of which is provincial (genus provinciale), in which there are: 
city-state finances, debts, interest, bonds, in the same way everything connected with tax-
farmers. The other [genus], because it cannot be satisfactorily dealt with without an 
edict, on possession of inheritances, possession of property, appointment of receivers, 
sale [of property], matters which are wont to be litigated and made according to the 
edict. The third (genus), containing all else respecting jurisdiction I have left unwritten. I 
have said that my rulings under this head would conform to the urban edicts [at Rome].82 
 
Cicero’s decision to maintain some matters of jurisdiction unwritten may be understood as granting 
himself, as a governor, the power of ‘accommodating’ his judgments to the provisions of urban 
edicts, especially in matters pertinent to Roman citizens. On the other hand, the fact that Cicero 
chose to include possession and sale of property and, more importantly, a matter of private law such 
as inheritance in his edict may in fact be pointing toward a certain degree of infringement upon the 
previously declared ‘legal autonomy’ of local population.  
It is due to this twofold role of Roman provincial government, that the ‘Romanity’ of administration 
seemingly (and, perhaps, unintentionally) penetrated the administration of justice too: the Roman 
provincial courts were ‘wont to express their decisions in the framework of the Roman law’ (cf. P. 
Oxy. 2.237, discussed in more detail in Ch. 3.3), while the imperial bureaus employed principles of 
Roman law in their answers to non-Romans’ petitions (P. Col. 123).83 One explanation for this may 
be that the high officials administering separate provinces were normally appointed for a relatively 
short period of time, and thus naturally lacked specific knowledge of the peculiarities of local 
administrative and legal systems.84 Yet another factor important to our understanding of Roman 
legal administration is the notion that many people responsible for it (in Rome as well as in the 
provinces) were not necessarily learned in law. Hence, the growing importance of jurists as 
                                                          
82 Breve autem edictum est propter hanc meam diairesis quod duobus generibus edicendum putavi. quorum unum est 
provinciale in quo est de rationibus civitatum, de aere alieno, de usura, de syngraphis, in eodem omnia de publicanis; 
alterum, quod sine edicto satis commode transigi non potest, de hereditatum possessionibus, de bonis possidendis, 
vendendis, magistris faciendis, quae ex edicto et postulari et fieri solent. tertium de reliquo iure dicundo agraphon 
reliqui. dixi me de eo genere mea decreta ad edicta urbana accommodaturum, Att. 6.1.15. 
83 Schiller (1978), 539.  
84 Bowman (1986), 66 on the administration of Roman Egypt. 
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trustworthy and authoritative legal experts: they were primarily significant for their actual legal and 
advisory service, rather than their writing.85  
Even when those appointed to administer justice possessed proper legal knowledge, they were 
nevertheless trained in the principles of Roman administration obtained through education in 
Roman law and experience in military service,86 the institutions which had little use in handling the 
needs of regional and, quite often, culturally heterogeneous populations. Therefore, the governors 
and other high officials in the provinces could at any time ‘give official (and thus Roman) sanction 
to norms of the local law by their judicial and administrative decisions’,87 especially if those local 
norms challenged Roman legal or moral values, e.g. cases of incest in Egypt or circumcision among 
the Jews. The so-called ‘Romanization’ of law was thus considerably indebted to the decisions of 
Roman provincial courts, imperial responses to petitions, as well as the edicts of the governors, all 
Roman in nature.88  
 
Conclusion   
 
The development of Roman law, especially the emergence of the ius gentium institutions was 
strongly dependent on Rome’s early relations with foreign states through commerce, alliances and 
conquest. Rome’s foreign affairs kept influencing her law throughout the period addressed, as a 
number of legal developments, such as extension of specifically Roman ‘citizen law’ institutions to 
non-citizens, worked towards keeping up the pace with Rome’s territorial, social and economic 
expansion or, in other words, Rome’s transition from a city-state to an imperial power. The growing 
flexibility and adaptation of rigid forms of the ius civile by an ever-extending body of 
complementary ius honorarium institutions point towards the same direction.  
The idea of a ‘new’ law being built upon or rather alongside the ‘old’ one without the formal 
abrogation of obsolete and no longer relevant rules and principles alerts to the problem of drawing 
solely on Roman legal (legislative and juristic) sources in the hope of learning about the actual state 
of law in practice. In a similar vein, Gardner maintains that: ‘The rules taken alone give a false 
picture of the actual workings in the society, and of its attitudes; [while] looking at the cases on 
their own runs the risk of misinterpretation or unjustified generalisation’.89 Thus, there is a strong 
                                                          
85 Harries (2006), 45.  
86 Bowman (1986), 66. 
87 Schiller (1978), 540; Taubenschlag (1951). 
88 Schiller (1978), 540. 
89 Gardner (1993), 6.  
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need to consider both theoretical and practical aspects of Roman law in order to gather a 
comprehensive picture of how it actually functioned and what role it had to play in the society.   
As we have already observed, there was no clear hierarchy of legislation in Roman law for most of 
the period in question: the civil laws proper (leges), decrees of the Senate, and personal decisions of 
the emperor were largely perceived as of equal validity, only the width of their application (e.g. 
extension to non-citizens) would vary. However, there was at all times a considerably clearly 
defined hierarchy of (legislative as well as judicial) authority, both at Rome and in its periphery. 
One of the main features of Roman administration of justice, especially in the provincial setting, 
was an apparent fluidity in the application of legal enactments, as well as openness to the 
interpretation of law. The highest judicial authorities in Rome and the provinces (the Senatorial or 
Imperial court and the provincial governor, respectively) were often addressed as interpreters of 
both Roman and provincial law. The knowledge of law (or the lack thereof) on behalf of those 
making judicial decisions also played a significant role in determining the nature of Roman legal 
administration as well as the process of the so-called ‘Romanization’ of law.90 If we consider both 
the application of legal enactments and the administration of justice, especially the ad hoc judicial 
decisions, or the use of precedent, we may conclude that there was a seemingly lesser degree of 
institutionalization in the provinces than there was at Rome.91 Furthermore, Rome, unlike the 
Hellenistic kingdoms it came to acquire in the East, was a citizen community living under its own 
citizen law which its representatives evidently knew and made use of, even in the periphery of 
Rome.92 The availability of Roman legal remedies could, nevertheless, be extended to non-citizens 
by means of official legislation, as well as through the agency of Roman provincial administration. 
Rome’s acquisition of a foreign territory thus inevitably meant a redefined set of legal relations to 
all those who became subject to the realm, even when local legal autonomy was proclaimed. 
The following chapter will treat the concept of Roman citizenship in a similar fashion, as it will 
primarily seek to establish the main legal rights and obligations conveyed by Roman citizenship, as 
well as the availability of Roman legal status to peregrines. It will furthermore work towards 
unravelling the complex relation between the acquisition of Roman citizenship and the legal rights 
and obligations retained in one’s local community. So far, based on the analysis of (theoretical) 
legal inabilities of non-citizens, it seems that the acquisition of Roman legal status would have first 
of all positively affected one’s commercial transactions with Romans, as well as enabled them to 
enter into personal and property relations via institutions of marriage, succession, and inheritance. 
                                                          
90 For a discussion of the knowledge of law among (provincial) individuals, see 3.3. 
91 That is, based on the premise that ‘law as a set of more or less formalized rules rather than improvised responses to 
circumstance suggests a degree of ‘institutionalization’’, Skoda (2012), 44.  
92 Kantor (2012), 78.  
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Such personal relations that came together with the possibility of making use of Roman private law 
institutions would have arguably entailed a certain degree of redefinition of local identities too.   
 
2. Roman citizenship 
 
Introduction  
 
From what we have observed in our discussion of different parts of Roman law, we gather that 
civitas, or citizenship, was a legal status, the possession of which would determine the availability 
of legal remedies, as well as a number of obligations one was expected to fulfill in order to enable 
those remedies.93 The importance of (legal) status in Roman society is evident throughout juristic 
and legislative sources too: Gaius, for instance, dedicated the entire first book of his Institutes to the 
law of persons and status that one could occupy in law.94 Roman respect for one’s standing, 
furthermore, shows even better in judicial actions and attitudes than it does in legal theory.95 
Garnsey, in his research on legal and social privilege in the Roman world, has shown that there 
were inequalities in legal procedures of both civil and criminal law based on peoples’ civic, as well 
as social, status.96 He calls this an ‘inevitable bias in the law’ which manifested itself not only in the 
official legislation, but also in the prejudice of judges, juries, and law-enforcement.97  
Much like ancient law, citizenship in antiquity largely operated on a principle of personality, which 
meant that, unless altered by some sort of grant or imperial constitution, one’s status depended 
entirely on birth, i.e. the status of one’s parents.98 Roman citizenship, thus, seems to have been ‘a 
precise expression of one particular set of rights and duties’, defined by Roman civil law.99 
Furthermore, it was a ‘bundle of rights’ that Rome could grant, either in whole or in part, to non-
                                                          
93 For instance, a Roman citizen woman wishing to initiate a legal transaction must have, as a prerequisite to its 
validation, had a male Roman citizen acting as her legal guardian (Gaius’ Inst. 1.144-145). Note also the decline of 
tutela mulieris by the end of the 2nd century CE (Inst. 1.190).  
94 According to him, all people were either slaves or free; if free, they could be either free-born (ingenui) or freedmen 
(libertini) etc., Inst. 1.9-12. In terms of civic status, one could be Roman citizen (i), Latin (ii), either coloniary or Junian, 
or a peregrinus (iii), i.e. foreigner, either a citizen of some foreign community or not. Such distinctions demonstrate the 
tendency of jurists to employ clearly defined categories in their interpretation of law.  
95 Garnsey (1970), 2. 
96 For instance, prohibition against applying corporal punishment, e.g. flogging, to Roman citizens, found in the Porcian 
laws of the 2nd century BCE and the lex Julia de vi publica of 50 BCE. Cf. Cicero Verr. 2.5.161-167 and Josephus Bell. 
Jud. 2.308 on the infringement of this prohibition.  
97 Garnsey (1970), 2-3. 
98 Crook (1967), 38. See also note 33 above.  
99 Ibid. 37.  
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Roman components within her dominions.100 But how fixed and predetermined was this ‘set of 
rights and duties’ exactly? How strictly defined were its confines, and how complicated was the 
access to it for outsiders? Finally, what were the main effects to one’s local legal and civic relations, 
carried along with one’s admittance to the Roman status? In search for answers to these and similar 
questions, this chapter will, among the rest, discuss the development of citizenship extension 
through to the second century CE, with particular focus on the Social War (90-88 BCE) as a turning 
point in Roman citizenship policy.  
 
2.1 Legal rights and obligations of a Roman citizen  
 
Before turning to the analysis of Roman citizenship policy, it will be useful to define the main legal 
rights and obligations that the possession of Roman legal status entailed. Suffrage, or the right to 
vote in the public assembly was one of the most important political rights held by Roman citizens, 
and it was especially relevant for the formation of state law during the early Republican period. By 
Cicero’s day, however, corruption and purchase of votes by wealthy political figures had already 
become a firmly entrenched practice.101 Further on, only Roman citizens were entitled to stand for 
public office in Rome, a right which provided with opportunity to gain political influence upon 
completion of the cursus honorum. The ius provocationis, or the right of appeal to the Roman 
assembly against summary execution (accusation and execution without trial) or corporal 
punishment, was another important asset to Roman citizen status. Although its usefulness declined 
over time, it nevertheless entailed a significant degree of protection from the state against the abuse 
of Roman magistrates, especially out in the provinces, by guaranteeing a fair trial in Rome.102   
Some of the more economic advantages brought by Roman citizenship had to do with tax-farming 
and land allotments: while the possibility to participate in land distribution schemes could 
significantly improve one’s financial situation within a relatively short period of time, tax-farming 
in the provinces guaranteed substantial and regular income.103 Yet another financially beneficial 
aspect of Roman citizenship was the exemption from tributum, i.e. direct taxes exacted from 
                                                          
100 Gaudement (1967), 525-34. 
101 Crook (1967), 43. Suffrage as a right to freely express one’s will has declined steadily during the Principate too, and 
the last known occasion of public assembly to vote legislation was under Nerva (r. 96-98 CE), ibid. Noteworthy too is 
the fact that there was no system of representation, which meant that all of the citizens willing to vote had to be present 
in Rome at the time of the assembly.  
102 Mouritsen (1998) relates that the ius provocationis has been seen by most scholars as the ‘major incentive’ behind 
the allied demand for citizenship at the onset of the Social War, as this right would in fact secure both their lives and 
property.  
103 Although tax-farming was mostly in the hands of Roman publicani, there is evidence of Italian allies taking part in 
the exploitation of Roman provinces as well, Mouritsen (1998), 93. 
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provincials and mainly used as contribution towards the upkeep of Roman army, as well as 
commissioning of public-work. Freedom of movement within the ager Romanus was one more 
privilege exercised by the Romans and, quite possibly, highly desired by non-citizens from less 
wealthy areas of Roman dominions, for ‘an enfranchisement would legalise migration to Rome and 
the affluent regions along the Tyrrhenian coast’.104  
Last but not least, the benefits provided by Roman private law institutions must be accounted for: 
the full possession of ius commercium and ius conubium, both restricted to the Roman citizenry, 
would enable the newly-made Romans to inherit estates from Roman citizens, a right which, 
according to Crook, must have been one of the two main inducements that ‘moved peregrines in 
their constant desire to acquire Roman citizenship’.105 There were many other attractions in 
personal and family law too, already discussed in the previous chapter. If one’s personal legal 
protection was guaranteed by the ius provocationis, the legal protection of one’s financial and 
business transactions were covered by a number of private law actions that a Roman citizen could 
enforce.   
One of the major obligations carried along with the possession of Roman citizenship, was 
compulsory military service. Legions, as the most ideologically significant, although not the most 
numerous part of the Roman army, consisted entirely of Roman citizens. For non-Romans, 
however, enrollment into the auxiliary army was a vehicle for acquiring the Roman citizenship 
upon successful completion of service. Citizens were, furthermore, liable to certain types of 
taxation: some of them, for instance, indirect taxes that fell on sales of slaves, manumission, and 
customs dues applied both to citizens and non-citizens; while others, such as the vicesima 
hereditatium (5% tax on inheritances, initiated by Augustus’ legislation) were exacted from Roman 
citizens only. A range of public munera, or liturgies was another burden that fell on the wealthier 
portion of Roman citizenry residing outside Rome, as well as the land-owning classes of 
municipalities, as they had to financially contribute toward the expenses of billeting of the Roman 
army, or provisions of transport for the government’s postal and supply service.106 While public 
munera such as billeting of soldiers primarily pressed provincials (whether Romans or not), there 
were plenty of costly civic responsibilities to be attended to specifically by Roman citizens, as they 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 94.  
105 Another being the right to hold political office, Crook (1967), 255-6. Mouritsen (1998), nevertheless, argues that 
both ius commercium and conubium, at least in their adapted or limited versions, may have been accessible to most of 
the Italian allies prior to the Social War (Livy 35.7.5; Diodorus 37.15.2). He therefore maintains that the commercial 
gains attributed to the allied request for Roman citizenship may be an exaggeration, as ‘overseas trade implied no legal 
obstacles for the Allies prior to the War’, 93.  
106 Crook (1967), 257 with reference to Cicero Att. 5.21.7: civitates locupletes ne in hiberna milites reciperent magnas 
pecunias dabant (rich cities were paying huge sums to avoid the army being quartered on them for the winter). 
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would regularly find themselves under the obligation to act as legal guardians (tutores), witnesses, 
judges or jurors in Roman courts, purely at their own expense. Similarly to the situation with public 
liturgies, we often find people attempting to escape the required duties by means of various 
excuses.107       
As to the law courts, surely enough, the mere possession of citizenship, especially at a later stage, 
did not in itself ensure privileged treatment: a lot more would depend on one’s social standing and 
wealth.108 There was, however, a reasonable expectation of every citizen that the state and the law 
would provide protection in exchange to fulfilment of required obligations. For, as Harries notes, ‘if 
one function of law was to ensure that everyone had his (even her) due … then the rules which 
ensured that this was the case were important for citizenship itself’.109  
 
2.2 Access to Roman citizenship  
a. The Lex Acilia de repetundis  
 
To summarize the above, the main attraction in obtaining the Roman citizen status seemingly rested 
on the hope of participating in land schemes and tax-farming, exercising political influence through 
admittance to public magistracies in Rome, as well as securing personal legal protection. In 
Mouritsen’s words, it was a ‘combination of political and economic motives’, which focused on the 
personal (political, social and economic) advantages that Roman citizenship would potentially 
bring.110 Mouritsen furthermore argues that at the dawn of the Social War, Roman citizenship was 
not yet a ‘privileged legal status’, so it could not have been what the allies took up their arms and 
fought for. He thus goes on to suggest that in the early grants, such as the lex Apuleia of 203 BCE 
or Marius’ grant of citizenship to his soldiers in 101 BCE (see below), the real reward ‘was 
probably little more than the admission ticket to land-distribution programmes’.111  
In order to confirm or discharge Mouritsen’s contention, let us take a closer look at a document 
preceding the conflict between Rome and her allies, namely, the lex Acilia de repetundis, dating to 
                                                          
107 Cf. FIRA 3.30 from Antinoopolis (Egypt), 148 CE.  
108 Garnsey (1970), 266. During the Empire, the division between citizens and non-citizens was mitigated by one 
between the honestiores, i.e. people of status and property, and the humiliores, or people of low social standing. In 
terms of legal affairs, the latter, even in possession of Roman citizenship, could be subject to the same kinds of 
punishment normally applicable only to non-citizens, e.g. crucifixion, torture, and corporal punishment.  
109 Harries (2006), 15.  
110 Mouritsen (1998), 87. The latter notion becomes Mouritsen’s main argument against seeing the Social War as an 
allied struggle for Roman citizenship: according to him, the personal rights and benefits provided by the acquisition of 
Roman citizenship may only explain individual and not the collective wish for it.  
111 Mouritsen (1998), 90-91. 
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123/2 BCE.112 It is neither the first, nor the last of the extortion laws (see note 79 above), but it 
assumes particular importance here as it contains an offer of Roman citizenship.113 The text at hand, 
like any other of the sort, deals with the right to recovery of property officially extorted by Roman 
magistrates in the provinces. The scope of the law stretches out to ‘anyone of the allies either of the 
Latin name or of foreign nations, or … anyone of those dependent on the discretion, dictation, 
power, or friendship of the Roman people’ (2).114 The law was thus not geographically confined but 
rather universal, and it is very probable that its provisions were more relevant to provincials further 
away from Rome than they were for the Italian allies.115  
Clauses 48 and 49 of the law contain two options between which a non-Roman, having successfully 
accused an offender of the crime of extortion, could choose: he could either take up Roman 
citizenship and, in addition, enjoy exemption from military service (vacatio), or, if he was unwilling 
(or unable) to do so, he could accept the grant of the right of appeal (ius provocationis) and 
immunity both from military service and from local duties (vacatio muneris et militiae). While the 
offer of Roman citizenship and vacatio in clause 48 seemingly applied to all successful non-Roman 
accusers willing to accept it, clause 49 excludes some Latin magistrates (‘dictator, praetor, or aedile 
in his own State’, l. 78) from taking up this offer. Bispham maintains that the alternative offer in 
clause 49 must have been directed to all peregrines too, while the Latin magistrates mentioned were 
excluded from the second option on the grounds that they had already possessed provocatio by 
virtue of their office.116  
The possibility of choice between Roman citizenship and an exclusively Roman right of appeal 
accompanied by local privileges, points to the mitigation of boundaries of Roman citizenship 
policy, as well as the overtly articulated significance of civitas Romana prior to the Social War. The 
offer of citizenship and vacatio, Bispham notes, was an important innovation, which ‘necessarily 
had an impact on Rome’s relations with her allies in Italy, in that it opened an avenue to the 
citizenship at a time when majority opinion was against extensions of the franchise’.117 
Furthermore, such universally applicable laws as the Lex repetundarum raised awareness of the 
benefits that the acquisition of Roman citizenship would potentially bring both among the allies and 
                                                          
112 On the problems regarding the dating of the law and its identification with the Gracchan legislation, see Badian 
(1954), 374-384.  
113 Historically, the most important provision of the law must have been the substitution of knights (equites) for senators 
in the juries of extortion trials. Trials of such cases would take place under the jurisdiction of peregrine praetor (Lex rep. 
2, 6).  
114 Lex rep. line 1: [... quoi socium no]minisve Latini exterarumve nationum, quoive in arbitratu dicione potestate 
amicitiav[e populi Romani …]. Latin text and translation used are taken from Johnson, Coleman-Norton & Bourne 
(1961).   
115 Bispham (2007), 127 with reference to Cic. Balb. 53.   
116 Ibid. 129. Some of these magistrates may have already possessed Roman citizenship too.  
117 Ibid. 127. 
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other peregrine communities in direct contact with Rome. The notion of such awareness well before 
the outbreak of the Social War thus seemingly discharges Mouritsen’s idea that Roman citizenship 
was not yet seen as a privileged legal status in the second century BCE.  
Bispham draws attention to the existence of an alternative reward option as evidence for the 
‘divergence of Italian attitudes towards [Roman] citizenship’.118 Nevertheless, both options in the 
Lex Acilia de repetundis in fact indicate a degree of infringement of one’s local identity: while 
becoming a Roman citizen in the second century BCE presumably also encouraged moving to the 
ager Romanus and thus abandoning one’s original dwelling,119 the alternative option meant staying 
at home yet being treated as Roman citizen within one’s native community:  
He shall have the right of appeal to the Roman people thereafter, just as if he were a 
Roman citizen; likewise, he and his sons and his grandsons through the male line shall be 
exempt and immune from military service and from public duties in his own State, (49). 
 
Roman legal privileges conferred on peregrines without their acquisition of Roman citizenship 
created a kind of legal fiction, which must have, to some extent, affected local legal relations as 
well. Furthermore, as Mouritsen duly noted, the second option demonstrates an ‘unequivocal 
example of Roman interference in the internal affairs of the allies’, in that the Romans felt they 
were in a position to grant local privileges to peregrines, i.e. exempt them from public munera 
within their own states.120 Similarly, Bispham maintains that Rome’s boldness to confer immunities 
on peregrines in their home towns may have been more deeply felt, and resented, in Italy.121 This 
brings us to the ‘Italian question’ which will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
b. The ‘Italian question’ revisited  
 
The first known proposal to extend Roman citizenship to the Italian allies who were willing to 
accept it appeared in 125 BCE, only slightly earlier than the Lex Acilia de repetundis, and was 
initiated by Marcus Fulvius Flaccus, a consul that year and a supporter of the Gracchi. It was, as 
Mouritsen calls it, an ‘entirely new policy element’, whose exact circumstances and implications 
remain largely unclear.122 What we do know is that Flaccus’ proposal was immediately met with 
                                                          
118 Ibid. 128.   
119 Mouritsen (1998), 89.  
120 Ibid. 
121 Bispham (2007), 129. 
122 Flaccus’ suggestion was most likely related to the Gracchan agrarian reforms and was meant to solve the problem of 
land division among the allies. However, Mouritsen (2008) maintains that what truly stood behind Flaccus’ proposal of 
citizenship extension was the need for manpower: the decline in Roman manpower (legions constituting only a minority 
of armed forces) implied a threat to undermine Rome’s hegemonic status in Italy, as well as signalled Rome’s inability 
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strong senatorial opposition and was withdrawn shortly after.123 Similarly, C. Gracchus’ reforms 
which also involved citizenship extension to Latins and Italians, were vetoed by another tribune.124 
Later, at the onset of the Social War in 91 BCE, Livius Drusus attempted to revive Flaccus’ bill, 
once again unsuccessfully, an event often perceived as the ‘last drop’ to provoke the Italian revolt. 
We will not here aim at expounding the causes of the Social War, but rather focus on possible 
reasons for citizenship grants and what the eventual enfranchisement meant for Rome’s relations 
with her former allies. This may help to bring to the fore the most valuable components of the 
Roman citizenship in the first century BCE, as well as to grasp an idea as to why the citizenship 
grant was an inevitable ‘concession’ Rome had to make in order to put an end to the crisis.  
Communis opinio holds that the creation of Roman Italy was accelerated by Italians asking for 
Roman citizenship in the late second century BCE. Roman refusal to admit Italians into their civitas 
instigated the Social War, which eventually led to the enfranchisement of the allies and to the 
establishment of a ‘politically unified Italy’. Mouritsen, however, calls the Social War ‘a political 
conflict between culturally distinct nations’, and offers an alternative version: Italians did not 
merely fight for Roman citizenship, but rather sought a real power-sharing, giving them equal 
influence over the empire and its resources.125 Social War was thus an attempt to break Rome’s 
supremacy by force, and to challenge her hegemony in the Italian Peninsula. Mouritsen argues that 
the citizenship version may well have been a later interpretation, in which the outcome of the War, 
i.e. the eventual enfranchisement of the allies, presupposed the reasons for it.126 However, while 
refuting the latter version as a possibly anachronistic imperial interpretation, Mouritsen fails to 
successfully convince of an alternative version of events. His idea of the Roman need for manpower 
lurking behind the earliest citizenship extension bills does not fully explain the allies’ wish to 
accept the offer, nor does it account for continuous senatorial opposition to such a solution.127 
Mouritsen furthermore argues that the allies had initially fought for freedom from the Roman 
hegemony and accepted the citizenship offer only upon losing the war. This explanation, however, 
does not account for Rome’s position and willingness to confer her citizen status on the peoples 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
to impose heavier burdens on the allies, 474. Thus, Rome was dependent on her allies, who ‘now carried a major 
responsibility for the empire, but without any corresponding share in its governance or formal exploitation … [which] 
created a natural tension between Romans and allies’.   
123 Appian BC 1.3.21. 
124 However, Mouritsen (2008) argues that the role of Italians in the Gracchan land reform was a ‘purely literary 
construction’ of Appian, and that ‘there is no evidence that Ti. Gracchus ever included Italians in his scheme’ either, 
472.  
125 Mouritsen (1998), passim.  
126 Ibid. 5. Most of the extant primary sources for the Social War come down to us from Imperial period (Velleius 
Paterculus, Valerius Maximus and, above all, Appian), and must have therefore been affected by ‘contemporary 
political propaganda’, ibid. 8.    
127 The repetitive withdrawals of early enfranchisement bills is yet another proof against Mouritsen’s contention that the 
Roman citizenship was not perceived as a privileged legal status before or during the time of the Social War.  
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who did not ask for it in the first place: in such a light, the eventual enfranchisement of the 
rebellious allies appears to be an imposition rather than a concession that Rome had to make in 
order to prevent any subsequent rebellion. Similarly, Wallace-Hadrill reacts to Mouritsen’s views 
by saying it is ‘perverse to argue that the demand for citizenship did not come from the 
beneficiaries themselves, whatever their motives’.128   
A lot more likely solution to the ‘Italian question’ has been offered by Keller who suggests that the 
allies did in fact fight for admittance to the Roman citizenry, and they did so due to the economic 
reasons triggered by the 2nd century BCE crisis. Keller draws attention to the divergence of interests 
between Rome and her Italian allies, as soon as the former was no longer able to provide economic 
benefits for non-citizen allies.129 Once Italian interests ceased to be represented at Rome, that is, 
shortly after the Ti. Gracchus’ reforms, there was a strong need to secure favourable treatment and 
legal protection in what was already largely perceived as a commonwealth, where the allies had a 
far larger share in its duties than they had in its privileges.130 Similarly, Bispham maintains that the 
allies, naturally, became less and less content with ‘the increasingly exclusive nature’ of Roman 
status, this exclusivity being ‘accelerated in proportion to the desirability and utility of 
citizenship’.131  
As already briefly mentioned above, Mouritsen stresses that the rights and advantages derived from 
Roman citizenship may only explain one’s individual wish for it, but they do not account for a 
collective one: while Roman citizenship extensions during and after the Social War largely applied 
to the entire city-states, the actual economic benefits entailed by a change of status, such as 
participation in land distribution schemes or political career in Rome, were to affect only a small 
portion of the allied communities.132 Nevertheless, it was most likely the same small portion of the 
communities which lead the revolts against Rome in the first place. There must have always been a 
group of influential local elite members well aware of the privileges and benefits to be gained from 
the acquisition of Roman citizen status, as they already were in direct contact with Rome through 
administrative structures, military service, as well as legislation such as the Lex Acilia de 
repetundis. The influence of local elites on their entire communities was often far greater than is 
usually assumed, and thus should not be underestimated. 
                                                          
128 Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 81 referring to Brunt (1971) who held that political rights were always worth fighting for, 
especially because becoming a citizen with franchise meant, at least in theory, active participation ‘in the debate over 
what that citizenship involved’.  
129 Keller (2007), 51.  
130 Cf. Bispham (2007): ‘Italians abroad seem not to have been distinguished from the Romans with whom they formed 
the conquering armies, and to have been alike considered members of the master race’, 158.  
131 Ibid. 127.  
132 Mouritsen (1998), 94. 
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Enfranchisement of the allies  
 
The eventual enfranchisement of the Italian allies was anything but a unanimous process. Rather, it 
spanned over three years (90-87 BCE) and involved passing of a number of different laws.133 The 
first, and often unduly held to be the main, enfranchisement law, the Lex Iulia de civitate, was 
passed in 90 BCE, and offered Roman citizenship to the Latins, as well as to some of the Italians 
who had remained loyal to Rome during the Social War.134 Indeed, the lex Iulia was an offer rather 
than a grant in its full sense, the implication being that those Latin and Italian communities were 
free to choose whether to become fundi of the law (i.e. to formally adopt the citizenship offer), or 
not. Bispham, in his analysis of the law, notes on the lex Iulia being more of a spontaneous reaction 
of the Roman Senate to an imminent crisis, a ‘hasty war measure’ rather than a premeditated 
solution to a wider problem.135 The scope and the effect of this law were thus smaller than is 
sometimes assumed, but it did certainly work as a turning point in the course of the Social War, as 
well as ‘the measure which marked the opening of the gates of Rome to the Italians’.136 The 
subsequent few enfranchisement laws (lex Plautia Papiria, lex Calpurnia, lex Pompeia) were all 
directed to the pro-Roman allies, and do not seem to suggest more than a reward for loyalty and 
dedication. 
During the following couple of years (88-87 BCE), once the Social War was over, it was up to the 
victorious Romans to decide the destiny of the rebels, who had now in the eyes of law obtained the 
status of dediticii populi.137 The universal enfranchisement of all former allies took place only when 
all of the rebels were disarmed; only then Rome could make the citizenship extension look like a 
favour to the defeated rather than a concession to the rebellious.138 There may have been an initial 
discrepancy in Rome’s treatment of the loyalists and the rebels too, in that the latter were largely 
enfranchised as ethnic groups rather than city-states, which complicated the subsequent 
municipalization process.139  
                                                          
133 The enfranchising laws known to us include the Lex Iulia (90 BCE), the lex Calpurnia (90/89 BCE), the lex Plautia 
Papiria (89 BCE) and the lex Pompeia (89 BCE), but there may have been a few more. Bispham (2007), 161.   
134 Namely, the Etruscans and Umbrians; in addition, it seemingly provided for individual bestowal of citizen rights 
virtutis causa: CIL I (2). 709.  
135 Bispham (2007) argues that it was drafted in a very short period of time and contained very little detail, as it should 
be expected from a law ‘that most Romans had hoped not to have to pass at all’, 165.   
136 Ibid. 163.  
137 i.e. ‘temporarily without any rights at all, until such time as it pleased their conquerors to dictate their new position’, 
Bennet (1923), 16, quoted in Bispham (2007), 175. See also Gaius Inst. 1.12-16 on the legal status of dediticii.  
138 Cf. Velleius Paterculus 2.17.1: Finito ex maxima parte … Italico bello, quo quidem Romani victis adflictisque ipsi 
exarmati quam integri universis civitatem dare maluerunt (the Italian war was now in large measure ended, the 
Romans, themselves exhausted, consenting to grant the citizenship individually to the conquered and humbled states in 
preference to giving it to them as a body when their own strength was still unimpaired). Translation by Shipley (1924).  
139 Bispham (2007), 183-4.  
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Tribal arrangement  
 
Upon universal citizenship extension in around 88/87 BCE, all enfranchised allies had to somehow 
be integrated into the Roman political body. The issue was solved by ascribing the new ‘Romans’ to 
the few newly created tribes which were to vote last in the comitia tributa and concilium plebis.140 
This, unlike the initial enfranchisement laws, was a premeditated and conscious political decision 
on behalf of the Roman Senate, meant to obstruct the new citizens from influencing Roman internal 
politics. The citizenship extension to the allies was thus, in Bispham’s words, ‘by and large 
meaningless in political terms’: it was not until around 70 BCE that the enfranchised allies ascribed 
to the newly created tribes came to possess any meaningful suffrage.141  
The universal enfranchisement of the allies did not imply their equal status among themselves 
either, and the consequent tribal arrangement was a means to enforce the desired stratification. 
Apart from disadvantaging the rebels and benefiting the loyalists, several other criteria were looked 
at, such as personal ties of local elite members to powerful Romans, the presence of significant 
number of Roman citizens before the enfranchisement, or geographical distance from Rome.142 
Thus, Bispham maintains, the tribal distribution was a process reflecting two conflicting agendas of 
the Roman people: the conservative wish to limit all new citizens’ political influence by restricting 
their votes on the one hand, and to benefit the pro-Roman allies while disadvantaging the former 
rebels on the other.143 By contributing to the gradation among the novi cives, the tribal arrangement 
must have influenced both the perception of Roman citizenship and of the privilege and rights it 
entailed. Simultaneously, the sudden increase in citizen body seemingly contributed to the growing 
exclusivity and political significance of the old Roman tribes: redefinition of civic relations took 
place and was felt both by the Romans and by their former allies.         
 
Aftermath of the Enfranchisement 
 
As we have already seen, due to unfortunate tribal arrangement, the political equality of the new 
citizens proved to be a fiction rather than reality: Mouritsen draws attention to the ‘centralized 
structure’ of Roman politics, which significantly disadvantaged the ‘extra-urban’ citizens in terms 
                                                          
140 Cf. earlier provision to smaller scale enfranchisement: the peregrines enfranchised through the lex de repetundis 
were to be ascribed into tribes of the convicted Roman magistrates (48): a practical solution or an ideologically loaded 
message?  
141 Bispham (2007), 189-90.  
142 Ibid. 197-8. 
143 ‘The process which led the censors to assign the tribes they did was one of negotiation and compromise between 
conservative, moderate, and radical elements, and designed to be acceptable to the ruling oligarchy as a whole before all 
others’, ibid. 198. 
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of their influence on legislation or the election of magistrates.144 Furthermore, there is no evidence 
for large-scale participation of local elite members in Roman politics, and there is hardly any extra-
urban magistrates found in Rome prior to the age of Augustus.145 On the one hand, this once again 
demonstrates the exclusive nature of Roman politics; on the other, it may also point to the lack of 
interest on behalf of the local elites in the urban matters.146 The vast majority of local nobles seem 
to have preferred to stay at home, where they often had to play an intermediary role between Rome 
and their own community. Comparably, Bispham speculates on the existence of certain groupings 
of communities (egalitarian or hierarchic in nature) at the time of the Social War, the leading one of 
which may have been able to become fundus of an enfranchisement law (e.g. lex Iulia) on behalf of 
the others.147 In which case, it once again becomes pointless to look for the allies’ universal 
‘collective wish’ for Roman citizenship grant, as Mouritsen does: the influence of local elites 
familiar with Roman power structures on their own communities, as well as the authority of certain 
communities over others may explain the ‘Italian question’ in more perspicuous terms.    
Setting aside the doubtful political influence, one should consider other results of enfranchisement 
and what they may have brought to the former allies. Together with the universal grant of Roman 
citizenship, there came a measure of Roman law.148 The extent to which the new citizens were able 
to employ Roman legal institutions largely depended on municipal laws which were to define the 
community’s legal identity in relation to Rome. Nevertheless, the ability to make use of Roman 
private law institutions, initiate legally protected transactions, and to enjoy the right of appeal may 
have been of a far greater importance to the Italians (and other provincials at large) than a political 
career or influence in Rome. While the suffrage seemingly meant little to the Italians, it was a share 
in economic gains on the one hand, and the availability of legal protection of one’s person and 
property on the other, that was a most likely driving force behind the allied requests for citizenship. 
Rome, in turn, while forced to make this concession to the allies (in fear of a renewed rebellion?), 
sought ways to limit the imminent political repercussions by restricting the allies’ right to vote.   
c. Citizenship grants and their implications  
 
Let us now set aside the Social War and the subsequent enfranchisement of Italy, and discuss the 
other circumstances and implications of Roman citizenship extension. Initially, and, as Cicero’s 
                                                          
144 Mouritsen (1998), 96-7.  
145 Mouritsen maintains that ‘their access to office and prestige depended on complete integration into the power 
networks of the capital … an urban base, i.e. patronage’, ibid. 98.  
146 Cf. Cicero complaining about Italians’ indifference toward Roman politics: Att. 8.7.5; 8.13.2; 8.16.1.    
147 Bispham (2007), 190-1.  
148 Schiller (1978), 525. 
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speeches suggest, up until at least the mid-1st century BCE, Roman citizenship was perceived as 
incompatible with any other citizen status.149 Furthermore, this principle of incompatibility appears 
to be based on the belief that ‘no one could be the subject of different judicial systems and 
legislations’.150 In Balb. 29-30, Cicero confirms not only the exclusivity of Roman citizenship (by 
referring to Roman law as ruling out the possibility of dual citizenship), but also the fact that there 
was a considerable amount of Romans who, unaware of such rules, had decided to become 
Athenian citizens and, furthermore, could serve there in largely exclusive public offices as judges or 
archons.151 Habicht notes that the integration of Romans into the Greek communities took place a 
lot earlier: in Athens, for instance, from 130 BCE onwards, the body of ephebes, which had 
previously consisted exclusively out of Athenian citizens, became accessible to foreigners, while in 
the mid-1st century BCE, we already see the first Romans with full membership of the Athenian 
Council.152 This development, although commonly known in Rome, does not seem to have 
mitigated the Roman views, as one fails to find evidence for admittance of foreigners into the high 
circles of Rome up until the time of Claudius (cf. Claudius’ speech in Tacitus’ Ann. 11.24-25). 
Nevertheless, the body of Roman citizens grew steadily and came to absorb foreign components 
from the Early Republic onwards, and we may briefly consider the ways by which the civitas 
Romana could be conferred on peregrines. Generally, there appear to have been two main types of 
citizenship extension, namely, by means of collective or individual grants.  
The collective citizenship grants would be conferred on entire peregrine communities at once, e.g. 
the enfranchisement of Latins and Italian allies in the aftermath of the Social War (see above). The 
peregrine communities would sometimes be granted Roman citizenship through the ‘Latin right’ 
(ius Latium) as a half-way stage.153 In 180s BCE a number of large colonial settlements of ‘Latin’ 
status were granted full Roman citizenship.154 Mouritsen observes that the grant of full citizen rights 
to the Latin communities involved reciprocal benefits: colonial elites would gain access to careers 
                                                          
149 See Cicero Balb. 29-30 on many Romans assuming Athenian citizenship and acting as full members of Athens’ 
citizenry without realizing that this meant the loss of their Roman citizenship. Cf. also Atticus’ refusal of Athenian 
citizenship offer due to the fear of curtailing his Roman citizen rights, Nep. Att. 3.1. Admittedly, within the Latin 
League (c. 7th century BCE – 338 BCE) a series of rights, e.g. trade, marriage, freedom of movement, could be 
exchanged without danger to one’s original citizenship.   
150 Mouritsen (1998), 87. If Mouritsen is right, it would show rather clearly that Roman citizenship was perceived to be 
closely tied to legal system (contra Noerr (1963)), the notion which sheds light on the Roman ‘legalistic cast of mind’.  
151 quo errore ductos vidi egomet non nullos imperitos homines, nostros civis, Athenis in numero iudicum atque 
Areopagitarum, certa tribu, certo numero, cum ignorarent, si illam civitatem essent adepti, hanc se perdidisse, Balb. 
30.  
152 Habicht (1997), 345. 
153 FIRA 1.70/71. Latin municipalities were communities with a ‘half-way’ position: they were not Roman citizens in 
the full sense, but possessed some of the citizen rights, Crook (1967), 43. Crook also notes that the ‘Latin’ status, which 
ceased to exist in Italy after 49 BCE, continued to be granted in the first century CE to peregrine communities (not to 
individuals), e.g. Vespasian granted the ius Latium to the whole of Spain in 73/74 CE (Pliny Nat. Hist. 3.30), ibid.  
154 Parma, Mutina, Saturnia founded in 183; Potentia, Pisaurum in 184, see Mouritsen (2008), 479. 
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in Rome as well as to public contracts, and benefit from suspension of tributum (167 BCE), while 
Rome would gain direct access to Latin manpower.155 However, the Senate remained reluctant 
towards lavish citizenship grants, probably because of ‘concerns about upsetting the status quo 
through large-scale expansions of citizen body’, as this would eventually result in both fiscal and 
political repercussions.156   
Since the Republican times, Rome was rather prone to confer its citizenship on magistrates and 
town councillors of ‘Latin’ communities.157 Apart from seeking participation of local elites in 
Roman administration, another logical reason for this type of grant may have been that Rome was 
simply not able to provide every town or municipality in her dominions with Roman magistrates. 
Nevertheless, there was a strong demand for pro-Roman governance, so granting citizenship to 
leading local magistrates was a solution to both maintain political stability within the community 
and ensure its loyalty to Rome.158    
As briefly mentioned above, the Roman citizenship could also be extended through military service, 
either to soldiers upon completion of their military service in the auxiliary regiments, or 
immediately upon their recruitment to legions. Some ad hoc grants would also take place: in 101 
BCE, after the battle of Vercellae, Marius is known to have conferred Roman citizenship on two 
cohorts of Italian soldiers as a reward for their loyalty and contribution. Marius’ action did not pass 
without repercussions, as he was severely criticized for doing so without the Senate’s permission.159 
Mouritsen notes that the admittance of Italian soldiers to the Roman citizenry was perceived as 
violating foedus between Rome and her Italian allies, a notion which only makes sense ‘within the 
context of automatic loss of local civil rights’.160 There is also ample evidence for later, imperial 
grants to discharged soldiers and their immediate family members.161   
Apart from enfranchising entire communities or specific components (magistrates, soldiers) therein, 
Roman citizenship could also be granted to individuals, singulatim. The practice of individual 
grants became especially prevalent in the Imperial period, as emperors would confer citizenship on 
                                                          
155 Mouritsen (2008), 480.  
156 Ibid. 481. 
157 Municipal charters of Salpensa and Malaca from the Flavian period still contain this right, which was the minus 
Latium (lesser Latin right), as opposed to the maius Latium giving citizenship to all members of a town council (appears 
under Hadrian), Crook (1967), 42. 
158 The possibility of bestowal of Roman citizenship upon holding of municipal office (the ius civitatis per magistratum 
adipiscendae) by the time of the Social War in order ‘to calm the Latin disaffection’, is rebuked by Mouritsen (1998), 
as he sees ‘immense legal and practical problems involved in implementing this right prior to the Social war’, 99.  
159 Plut. Mar. 28.2.  
160 Mouritsen (1998), 90.  
161 Cf. FIRA 1.27. The right of retrospective grant of citizenship to children born during service was abolished around 
140 CE when marriage during service was forbidden, Crook (1967), 42. See also Shaw (2000) on ‘biologically 
transmitted citizenship’, i.e. the ‘centrality of the family as the means by which the citizenship was transmitted 
automatically to succeeding generations’, 367-8.  
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peregrines as a reward for various services provided or expected. Crook calls this development ‘a 
potential door to traffic in Roman citizenship’, as he gives the famous example of Apostle Paul’s 
conversation with the tribune who admits to having paid a lot of money for his citizenship.162 
Furthermore, Cassius Dio speaks of citizenship purchase during the reign of Claudius as a widely 
contested but very common and well-known practice (60.17.5-6).  
An acquisition of Roman citizenship was also possible through familial ties and personal relations. 
Gaius informs us of some cases of intermarriage, when Roman citizenship could be extended to all 
peregrine family members, provided they were able to prove in court that they had entered into such 
marriage by misjudgement of status:  
if a male Roman citizen marries a peregrine woman, or vice versa, their child is a 
peregrine; but if a marriage was entered into in error [of status] its defect is cured by the 
senatusconsultum, Inst. 1.75.  
 
There is a similar treatment of intermarriage based on an ‘error of status’ visible in the provincial 
record from Roman Egypt too. While most of the prohibitive provisions of the Gnomon, as well as 
those explicitly dealing with violation and non-conformity of status (clauses 42-44, 53, 56) reveal 
an eager legal protection of Roman citizenship and status,163 clauses 46 and 47 allow some degree 
of lenience in law pertaining to intermarriage ‘by ignorance’ (κατ’ ἄγνοιαν):  
It has been granted to Roman (male) citizens or (male) citizens [of a Greek polis] who 
have married an Egyptian woman by ignorance, to be exempt from liability and for the 
children to follow the father’s status (46),  
  
A female citizen (of a Greek polis) who marries an Egyptian by ignorance is not 
responsible; and if both give a birth certificate, the citizenship for the children is granted 
(47).164 
  
These provisions strongly suggest that the distinction between Roman and Greek citizenry and the 
class of ‘Egyptians’ was not at all visible, but it was certainly a legal one.165 In Roman Egypt, much 
like anywhere else in the Roman Empire, it was precisely the citizenship that played a key role in 
attributing one’s legal identity. The acquisition of Roman citizen status for a peregrine (whether 
ethnically Greek or Egyptian) thus evidently meant an improved position in the eyes of law.  
Summing it all up, the privileges and legal protection that Roman citizenship had to offer should be 
seen in the light of the evidence of peregrines willing to pay significant amounts of money, enter 
                                                          
162 Acts 22:28.  
163 Perhaps best reflected by provisions regarding the legal status inherited by children of mixed marriages, e.g.: ‘If a 
Roman man or woman is joined in marriage with an urban Greek or an Egyptian, their children follow the inferior 
status’ (39). Note how the ius gentium principle of children following the maternal line in case of a non-Roman 
marriage (note 33 above) no longer applies.  
164 Translation by Fischer-Bovet (2013). 
165 Cf. Fischer-Bovet (2013), 14.  
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illegal activities such as bribery, or risk huge fines by falsely assuming Roman citizen status. 
Admittedly, most of such evidence stems from imperial rather than Republican period, which at 
first glance suggests the development and growth of significance of Roman citizen status, directly 
dependent on the growing hegemony of Rome. The citizenship offer as a reward for successful 
prosecution in the Lex Acilia de repetundis as well as the analysis of allies’ motives for rebellion, 
however, suggest a somewhat earlier timeframe.   
Even if we adopt the idea that Roman citizenship assumed its highest importance in the eyes of 
peregrine communities only in the imperial period (at the same time when it presumably lost its 
incompatibility), we must admit that the Roman reluctance to confer its civitas on peregrines 
stretches way back. Furthermore, the criticism towards citizenship grants remained largely the same 
throughout both periods addressed. Similarly to the Senate’s critique of Marius’ actions in 101 
BCE, we find Roman authors expressing their bitter attitudes towards imperial citizenship grants 
too, e.g. Seneca remarks on Claudius’ numerous citizenship extensions: ‘He had decided to put all 
the Greeks, Gauls, Spaniards and Britons into togas’ (Apocol. 3). There is, thus, very similar notion 
of citizenship extension crossing paths with devaluation of Roman identity that underlies both 
Plutarch’s account of the aftermath of the battle of Vercellae and Seneca’s rebuke of Claudius’ 
lavishness in citizenship grants.  
 
2.3 Legal rights and obligations to one’s local community upon acquisition of 
Roman citizenship  
 
Although the principle of incompatibility of Roman citizenship is still discernable in Cicero’s 
speeches some 30 years after the Social War (Balb. 29-30; Caec. 100), on several other occasions 
he also speaks of the possibility of belonging to two patriae – one by nature, and one by reason of 
citizenship.166 What did then the acquisition of a new, Roman, set of legal and civic relations mean 
in terms of one’s rights and obligations in his or her local habitat?   
The municipalisation of Italian communities, as convincingly shown by Bispham’s analysis of 
enfranchisement laws, was more or less contemporaneous to the tribal distribution (86/85 BCE). 
Bispham takes Aulus Gellius’ definition of a municipium as an indication that Roman laws (or 
Roman ius civile in its entirety) were not binding on the newly established Italian municipia, and 
that the local statutes prevailed, unless the Roman laws were voluntarily adopted by the process of 
                                                          
166 De leg. 2.2.5; Ep. ad fam. 13.11; Balb. 27-29. 
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fundus fieri.167 In his Attic Nights, Gellius discusses the common misuse of the terms municipium 
and colonia, and the confusion of the two types of Roman settlements in the time of Hadrian (r. 
117-138). When trying to distinguish between a municipium and a colony, he defines the two in 
terms of their legal relations to Rome:   
municipes then are Roman citizens from municipia who use their own laws and their own 
authority, are only voluntary participants in a duty together with the Roman people … 
bound by no other demands nor by any law of the Roman people, unless that to which 
their populus has become fundus,  
 
<…> But the relationship of the colonies is a different one; for they do not come into 
citizenship from without, nor grow from roots of their own, but they are as it were 
transplanted from the State and have all the laws and institutions of the Roman people, 
not those of their own choice.168 
 
The key element in Gellius’ description of the difference between municipes and inhabitants of the 
colonies is the former’s freedom of choice of what laws and customs to follow as well as their 
voluntary participation in adopting the Roman ones. The cives Romani of a certain municipium are 
described as a separate populus, distinct from the populus Romanus, whose laws they may or may 
not adhere to. Indeed, in Gellius’ thought there is no direct link between the acquisition of Roman 
citizenship by municipia and their effective ‘becoming Roman’. The municipia, unlike colonies 
which were formed from already existing citizens and, as such, were bound to follow Roman laws 
and institutions, did not have the same requirements made of them due to their extrinsic acquisition 
of citizenship.   
The adoption of specific Roman statutes by individual Italian and Latin communities, which took 
place at least since the second century BCE, that is, well before their municipalisation, seemingly 
implied the replacement of local measures on matters that the adopted legislation covered.169 
Nevertheless, exceptions to such freedom of choice must have been made in cases of crucial 
importance or, in Bispham’s words, where the maiestas or the imperium populi Romani were 
considered to be at stake.170 The level of ‘free will’ in adopting or ignoring Roman statutes and 
laws, thus, may not have been the same for all communities alike and depended heavily on 
circumstance.   
                                                          
167 Bispham (2007), 187. 
168 Municipes ergo sunt cives Romani ex municipiis, legibus suis et suo iure utentes, muneris tantum cum populo 
Romano honorari participes, a quo munere capessendo appellati videntur, nullis aliis necessitatibus neque ulla populi 
Romani lege adstricti, nisi in quam populus eorum fundus factus est <…> Sed coloniarum alia necessitudo est; non 
enim veniunt extrinsecus in civitatem nec suis radicibus nituntur, sed ex civitate quasi propagatae sunt et iura 
institutaque omnia populi Romani, non sui arbitrii, habent., NA 16.13.6-8. Translation by Rolfe (1927).  
169 Contrary to the Roman practice of enabling new legal measures without abrogating the old ones, see Ch. 1.2.  
170 Bispham (2007), 187.  
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a. ‘Dual citizenship’  
 
It is widely assumed that with the imperial regime taking firm hold, i.e. from the 1st century CE 
onwards, the status of Roman citizenship changed in a way that it lost the principles of 
incompatibility and territoriality, and gradually became ‘a privileged extra status’, to be enjoyed in 
addition to one’s regional civic affiliation.171 This has been generally termed as ‘dual citizenship’, a 
phenomenon which Mouritsen calls ‘an important and fully integrated part of the legal structure of 
the empire’.172 He does, on another occasion, also note that the development of ‘dual citizenship’ 
itself was most likely a slow process, obstructed by traditional legal conservatism, and that ‘the 
double citizenship does not appear to have been formally adopted at any stage’.173 The already 
discussed evidence of transfer of Roman privileges to peregrines without the bestowal of citizenship 
(lex repetundarum (49)), or the ability to continue making use of local laws upon acquisition of 
Roman citizen status (Gellius on municipia), however, suggests that the ‘exclusivity’ of Roman 
citizenship, together with the legal relations it entailed, was fairly more fluid and flexible, and that 
the developments similar to that of ‘dual citizenship’ took place already under the Republic.174  
Admittedly, with Caesar and, all the more, with Octavian, the practice of granting Roman 
citizenship to peregrines significantly accelerated. The en bloc citizenship extensions were usually 
followed by legislation (municipal or colonial charters) determining legal relations within that 
specific area, as well as its relations to Rome. Furthermore, the publication of these charters in the 
heart of a town (usually, in the forum) ensured their accessibility to everyone within the commune. 
Individual grants, on the other hand, raised a problem of whether a beneficiary should abandon all 
of his former legal rights and obligations to his home community (had he decided to stay there), or 
to become subject of two, possibly contradicting, sets of legal relations.  
Indeed, from Octavian’s time onwards the common practice seems to have been to either require 
beneficiaries of citizenship grants to continue their civic and legal duties in their original 
communities, or to specifically exempt from them. The earlier, Republican grants of immunity from 
local duties (e.g. the lex repetundarum (48-49)) seemingly give way to the new type of citizenship 
                                                          
171 Crook (1967), 38-40; Schiller (1978), Mouritsen (1998) et al.  
172 Mouritsen (1998), 88. Schiller (1978), on the other hand, points to the frequent inaccuracy in scholarly use of the 
term, for ‘one cannot precisely delineate the areas of each legal system, Roman or local, to which the neo-Roman is 
subject’, 545.  
173 Mouritsen (1998), 91. 
174 The practice of exchange of hospitium within one’s local community upon acquisition of Roman citizenship also 
points to the negotiation between the two, supposedly, exclusive sets of legal and civic relations in the first half of the 
1st century BCE, see Cic. Balb. 42. 
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extensions, all the more frequently afforded with the condition that the laws and customs of one’s 
original community should be continuously adhered to.175  
A couple of well-known examples of the sort come down to us from the time of Octavian: Edictum 
Octaviani de Seleuco Nauarcha (41 BCE, Rhosus) and Edictum Octaviani de privilegiis 
veteranorum (31 BCE, Egypt).176 Both edicts specifically allow the newly enfranchised persons to 
legally enjoy local privileges (iure liceat uti), e.g. to hold local civic honours, if they so wished. 
This provision meant that the beneficiaries of Roman citizenship grant were equally able to hold 
office or perform public duties in Rome as well as in their home communities.177 The edict of 41 
BCE, furthermore, granted Seleucus of Rhosos a right to exercise a choice of jurisdiction either in a 
criminal or in a civil suit, which conveyed that he could choose whether his case be tried before the 
local courts, or before the Roman tribunal.178 Aside from the freedom of choice of which court to 
attend, Sherwin-White maintains that Seleucus must have remained bound to the civil laws of 
Rhosos so long as he lived there. However, a newly-made Roman fell subject to certain provisions 
of Roman private law, which meant that, normally, ‘in matters of personal status, succession, and 
testamentary disposition, the enfranchised person resident in his place of origin followed Roman 
civil law’.179  
Noteworthy is that in the Republican period similar privileges (freedom of choice of jurisdiction, 
the right of appeal to the Roman Senate, and an exemption from civic taxes and obligations) could 
be conferred on peregrines even without the citizenship extension.180 Such evidence leads Sherwin-
White to think that the immunities granted by Octavian may have been ‘independent of the grant of 
Roman franchise’, and that the practice which we find in these edicts is not yet too far remote from 
Republican usage. The permissive nature of the grant of local privileges and, especially, those 
pertinent to local jurisdiction, may seem to imply that a beneficiary would normally lose them upon 
the acquisition of Roman citizen status. Thus, for instance, the clauses on Seleucus as a defendant 
‘may be intended to make explicit the privileged judicial position which a Roman citizen should 
enjoy even in a free city, throughout the Roman world’.181   
                                                          
175 Schiller (1978), 545. 
176 FIRA 1.55 (9-31), FIRA 1.56 (2-7).  
177 Sherwin-White (1973), 296.  
178 Ibid. While containing the same or similar grants of Roman and municipal immunity (5, 8-11, 15-16), freedom from 
billeting, and grant to maintain local civic honours, FIRA 1.56 does not include any provision on jurisdictional matters. 
Sherwin-White notes that they were most likely unnecessary in a Roman province (Egypt), as compared to the 
autonomous city of Rhosos. 
179 Ibid. For instance, his will had to be drawn in Latin and adhere to Roman law. 
180 FIRA 1.35.10-15 (78 BCE), for instance, records the Roman Senate granting such privileges to three navarchs of 
Greek origin.  
181 Sherwin-White (1973), 298. 
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Mouritsen holds that the conditions of citizenship extension had to be adjusted for the mere fact that 
all the more beneficiaries of these grants continued to live outside the ager Romanus, and he takes 
one’s ability to hold local honours (conferred by specific provisions in the enfranchisement edict) as 
a sign of the development of the concept of ‘dual citizenship’.182 Sherwin-White has offered a 
slightly nuanced but similar inference, in that he took the permissive clauses in Octavian’s and other 
citizenship grants as likely evidence that without these specific provisions and exemptions the 
beneficiary of Roman citizenship grant would be ‘totally sundered from his former patria’.183 Either 
way, the need to assert (or dismiss) the rights and obligations to one’s local community upon 
bestowal of Roman citizen status point to the absence of a standardized method of citizenship 
extension in the 1st century BCE, and demonstrates an attempt to negotiate between the two sets of 
legal and civic relations.   
b. Imperial practice and the development of Roman citizenship  
 
In the Edictum Augusti de Cyrenaeis, originating in 7-6 BCE, so a few decades later than those 
previously discussed, we observe an instructive and hortative rather than permissive nature of 
largely the same provision:   
If any persons in the province of Cyrene have been honoured with Roman citizenship, 
nevertheless I order that they shall perform the liturgical services required of the 
community of Greeks in their proper turn, except for those persons to whom citizenship 
was granted together with exemption from taxation by a law or resolution of the Senate 
or decision of my father or myself …184  
 
The practice of including into enfranchisement edicts the provisions regarding beneficiary’s legal 
and civic relations to his own community persists all the way into the second century CE. The so-
called Tabula Banasitana, an inscription from a Moroccan town of Banasa dating to 177 CE, is a 
bestowal of Roman citizenship by Marcus Aurelius to a certain Julianus, princeps of the Zegrensi 
tribe, and his family, which contains a provision that the grant is made salvo iure gentis, i.e. 
‘without prejudice to the law of their tribe’.  
This relatively new development prevalent in the imperial policy of citizenship extension has been 
all too often regarded as a proof for Roman cultural relativism.185 Rather than Rome’s mere 
unwillingness to interfere in the local affairs of peregrine communities, some more practical reasons 
                                                          
182 Mouritsen (1998), 91. Sherwin-White (1973), too, recognizes that the conditions of enfranchisement edicts were in 
most cases tailored to local circumstance, 299.  
183 Sherwin-White (1973), 300.  
184 FIRA 1.68. Translated by Schiller (1978), 481.  
185 Cf. Crook (1967): ‘Rome protected legal rights, public and private, which peregrines had in their own communities 
with as little interference – beyond public safety and the maintenance of upper-class control – as possible’, 256.  
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most likely lurked behind, such as attempts to prevent local disaffection towards privileged Roman 
citizens or, all the more likely, to maintain the influence of newly enfranchised elites over their 
native communities. While in the Republican times citizenship extension was possible solely with 
the authorization of the Roman Senate and, due to the persistent conservatism of senatorial class, 
often proved to be ‘last resort’ type of a political decision; during the Imperial period it was the 
Emperor alone who granted both individual and en bloc citizenship extensions, sometimes more 
lavishly than the Senate would like.186 The main reason for the increase in citizenship grants during 
the Empire was directly related to its territorial expansion, the primary interest of the Emperor thus 
being to secure the loyalty of local elites by incorporating them into Roman political power 
structures, as well as to assure the elites’ authority over their home communities. In this context, the 
salvo iure gentis provision of imperial citizenship grants appears to be a conscious measure aimed 
at fulfilling both objectives at once. The local elites, too, were often rather proactive in adopting or 
plainly imitating Roman forms and institutions, this way familiarizing their communities with 
Roman-like structures before officially appealing to the Emperor for a collective grant of the ius 
Latium or municipal status to their home towns.187  
Both the perceptible value and, accordingly, the exclusivity of Roman citizenship seemingly grew 
in correlation with Rome’s territorial expansion and her growing hegemony in the Mediterranean 
and beyond. Although increasingly exclusive in nature, Roman citizenship, when acquired by a 
non-Roman individual or community, could in most cases be enjoyed in conjunction with local 
civic affiliations, under the Republic and the Empire alike. This development was predetermined 
not by some intrinsic quality of Roman citizenship or its perception, but rather by the circumstances 
of citizenship extension: it was beneficial to Rome that her subjects, especially the elites among 
them, be loyal to Rome and, simultaneously, disseminate that loyalty within their home 
communities. Full integration of non-Roman components of the Empire into its citizenry seems to 
have never been of pivotal concern to the Romans, just as there was no attempt at political, let alone 
cultural, unification of the Empire, at least not until the Constitutio Antoniniana. In this, we are able 
to discern one of the paradoxes provided by the development of Roman citizenship: while the 
exclusivity and significance of Roman citizen status grew together with Rome’s territorial 
expansion and reached its height in the first two centuries CE, the actual power that the citizenship 
entailed, at least in terms of privileged treatment, gradually declined as a result of the growing 
citizenship extension.188 Although the entirety of rights and duties bestowed together with one’s 
                                                          
186 See the discussion in Shaw (2000), 364. 
187 Ibid. 365.  
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admittance to the Roman citizenry seemingly constituted the essence of being a Roman citizen and, 
as such, accounted for the sense of belonging to the Roman state; we may infer from Gellius’ 
definition above as well as from extant epigraphic and literary record that the degree of one’s actual 
‘becoming Roman’ upon the acquisition of citizenship primarily depended on voluntary rather than 
superimposed actions.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The degree of freedom of choice provided in the early enfranchisement grants argues against the 
complete incompatibility of the Roman citizenship during the late Republican period: an alternative 
option in the Lex Acilia de repetundis of 123/2 BCE, the offers of citizenship extension by Flaccus’ 
bill of 125 BCE or the Lex Iulia of 90 BCE, and the possibility to choose which laws to adhere to 
all demonstrate some flexibility in the matter, as well as Rome’s willingness to negotiate the 
conditions of admittance to her citizenry. Furthermore, particular rights constituting the civitas 
Romana could be extended to non-Romans without the citizenship bestowal, which alerts that the 
perception of Roman citizenship as a clearly defined ‘bundle of rights and duties’ was fairly flexible 
during the Republican period too. The possibility to simultaneously enjoy both Roman and local 
sets of legal and civic relations was evidently possible prior to the 1st century CE, and is thus not 
directly related to the shift from the Republican to Imperial rule.   
Bispham quite righteously maintains that the ‘increasingly exclusive nature’ of Roman citizen status 
was directly proportionate to its growing utility and, accordingly, desirability among non-
citizens.189 The Social War thus stands as a landmark indicating the conflict over the acquisition of 
citizen rights by those who had participated in the Roman commonwealth for decades yet felt 
mistreated and misrepresented by the politically superior Rome. Being fairly familiar with the 
benefits that the Roman citizenship had to offer, Italians sought to secure their rights by joining in 
the political hegemony of Rome. However, as we shall see in the following chapter, the allied 
struggle for citizenship and their eventual enfranchisement, contrary to Mouritsen’s views, need not 
have compromised their sense of local identity.  
Admittedly, instead of being overzealous in protecting local legal rights, as is sometimes assumed, 
Rome could and did interfere whenever such action was felt necessary or beneficial to the realm. 
We see in the imperial edicts above, just like in the Lex repetundarum that both the retention of 
local duties and privileges, and the exemption from them were still firmly in the hands of the 
Romans who granted their citizenship, or otherwise encroached upon local legal and civic relations. 
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However, what is frequently overlooked in discussing the spread of Roman citizenship, is the notion 
that the developments in citizenship extension were defined by proactive native agency no less than 
Rome’s official policy. The voluntary adoption of Roman laws by the Italian communities well 
before the Social War, local elites’ ‘mimicry’ of Roman forms and institutions prior to their 
acquisition of Roman, Latin or municipal status, and the strive towards, albeit illegal assumption of 
Roman status evident in the provincial documentary record all point toward peregrines’ awareness 
of beneficial laws and legal positions as well as recognition of privileges conveyed by the 
possession of civitas Romana.  
While acquisition of Roman citizenship, either via collective or individual grant, was a symbolic 
acknowledgement of one’s participation in the Roman Empire,190 the extent to which the change of 
status affected local relations was not unanimous throughout the Empire. Roman interference (or 
the lack thereof) into legal and civic affairs of subjected peoples within her dominions, its possible 
impact on local communities, and their response to change through assumption, negotiation and 
(re)definition of identities will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
190 Cf. Schiller (1978) on the Constitutio Antoniniana which ‘put into legal terms the sense of the mass of inhabitants as 
belonging to the Empire’, 547.  
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3. (Roman) Identity 
 
Introduction: recent approaches to the study of identity 
 
Recent scholarship in Roman studies tends to move its focus away from the imperial centre and 
shift towards the periphery of Rome, i.e. her provinces, as well as turn against the traditional, elite-
centred models, such as that of ‘Romanization’, while searching for new approaches to enable a 
more fruitful explanation of the changes undergone by the subject peoples in various parts of the 
Empire.191 Mattingly, alongside a number of scholars, discards ‘Romanization’ paradigm as over-
simplistic and self-fulfilling, and offers a new theoretical framework instead, one ‘based on the 
recognition of heterogeneous social and cultural behaviour’. The key word in his analysis is 
‘identity’, which is meant to relate to ‘patterns of behaviour’, rather than ‘perceivable differences in 
material culture alone’.192  
In his theory, Mattingly emphasizes variations between different communities in terms of their 
cultural preferences, as well as the formation of diverse groupings within a single community, based 
on social status, occupation or level of urbanization.193 Each of these groupings, regardless of its 
size or cultural background which, in the case of military communities, for instance, could be 
predominantly heterogeneous, was seemingly able to construct its own distinct identity in response 
to its relation to Rome. This need not have necessarily been a ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ kind of a 
process, as various models of ‘Romanization’ have tended to imply. Instead, being of a lot higher 
complexity, it was evidently dependant on a number of circumstances, such as organization of the 
community prior to the coming of Romans, the nature of contact with Rome (commercial relations, 
acquisition or conquest), and the status of the community after its incorporation into the Empire. 
The construction or (re-)definition of identity by the affected communities and the various 
groupings therein were thus necessarily influenced or, rather, bound up with what Mattingly calls 
‘power negotiations’ between the Roman State and its subjects.194  
Similarly to Mattingly’s theory of ‘discrepant experience’ or ‘discrepant identities’, Yntema has 
recently argued for the existence of the so-called ‘plural identity’ under the Romans. These partially 
                                                          
191 To name only a few works addressing the topic of ‘Romanization’, there are editions by Woolf (1992), Mattingly 
(1997), MacMullen (2000), Keay and Terrentano (2001), Schörner (2005), and Hingley (2005). These and other works 
stand in line with a number of articles, dealing both with the process and the concept of ‘Romanization’, often merely 
providing critique towards the use and utility of the term, e.g. Barret (1997:51-66), or Merryweather and Prag (2002:8-
10). Cf. Alcock (2001): ‘I admit that I have come to detest the word ‘Romanization’’, 227.  
192 Mattingly (2011), 208. Identity has become a fashionable research subject in the past decade, in the fields of both 
archaeology and ancient history: see, for instance recent publications of Revell (2009), Hales and Hodos (2010).  
193 Namely, he sees most of the communities under direct Roman influence to be split up into (at least) three main 
groupings: military community, urban community, and rural dwellers.    
194 Mattingly (2011), 206-7.  
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draw on somewhat older Gellner’s model of ‘cultural differentiation’ which allows for a high 
degree of cultural homogeneity among the elite, but a much more fragmented culture and greater 
local variations among lower-status groups.195 Lomas, too, in her analysis of Roman Italy maintains 
that the external (both Greek and Roman) influences were absorbed and adapted to local 
environment, thus contributing to the creation of distinctive and unique regional cultures.196  
To what extent can these theories of identity be applied to the study of Roman law and citizenship? 
From what was discussed in the previous chapters, it is certainly possible to discern patterns of 
interrelation between law, citizenship, and identity or, rather, between one’s legal, civic and 
personal identities. The present chapter intends to enquire into deployment and manipulation of 
legal and civic status, and explore whether assuming a new, Roman juridical identity implied any 
changes to a personal, or localized one. We have already observed the persistently negative Roman 
response toward increasing citizenship extension both in the Late Republican and Early Imperial 
periods, which implies that the civic status was not merely a legal, but also a highly emotive 
concept.197 Harries maintains that the issue of freedom and civic rights was ‘especially sensitive’ in 
the aftermath of the Social War, and that the prolonged process of enrolment of new citizens into 
the Roman civic fabric ‘both enlarged and redefined the Roman citizen community’.198 We will 
thus first of all go back to the ‘Italian question’ by taking a closer look at the pressing identity 
issues in the post-Social War Italy. Then, we will touch upon Roman municipal legislation taking 
the Lex Irnitana of the 1st century CE as an example of imperial municipalisation. Finally, we will 
progress with the discussion of the legal environment in the 2nd century CE provinces, employing 
the evidence from Roman Egypt, Arabia Petraea and Bithynia/Pontus. The developments such as 
linguistic change, adoption of procedural and documentary practice, as well as laws at work will all 
be treated through the concepts of individual agency, knowledge of law and willingness to 
participate.   
 
3.1 Post-Social War Italy: politically and culturally homogenous entity? 
 
In his interpretation of the ‘Italian question’, Mouritsen emphasizes the sovereignty, as well as 
political and cultural diversity of the Italian allies prior to the Social War.199 The notion of 
‘politically autonomous and culturally distinct’ Italians helped Mouritsen build his argument that 
                                                          
195 Yntema (2009), Gellner (1983), 8-13. 
196 Lomas (1993), 186.  
197 Cf. Harries (2006), 146-7. 
198 Ibid.  
199 Mouritsen (1998) passim; together with Mouritsen (2008), 474 and Patterson (2006), 606-624.  
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the Social War was primarily an ‘international conflict’ between the Romans and those perceived 
by them as foreigners.200 Interestingly, we often see Italians presented in the extant literary sources 
largely in the same terms as the Romans from as early as the second half of the 1st century BCE, 
that is, less than half a century after the Social War. At the beginning of his political career in Rome 
Cicero could fairly count on the support of the townspeople of his native Arpinum, and his 
consequent political success owed a lot to his influence among Italians.201 Furthermore, the 
aforementioned Cicero’s claims that the Italians should not be indifferent to Roman politics 
demonstrate his recognition of them as belonging to the same political body shortly after their 
effective enrolment into the Roman tribes.202 Slightly later, we find Velleius Paterculus (19 BCE – 
31 CE) describing the Italian allies at the time of the Social War as peoples of the same folk and 
blood (homines eiusdem et gentis et sanguinis, 2.15.2) as the Romans; a notion which, in 
Mouritsen’s words, deliberately turns the international conflict, as it were, into a civil war. Since 
Velleius himself came from Campania in Italy, Mouritsen sees his position as a premeditated 
background for portraying his own family history.203 To Appian (95 - 165 CE) too, the Italians and 
Romans ‘effectively formed a single nation divided by obsolete, purely formal barriers’.204 Apart 
from discarding Appian’s view as a later, imperial interpretation influenced by a change in the 
perception of the Roman citizenship, Mouritsen believes to have found an interior motive to 
Appian’s take on the events too.205 Thus, Mouritsen argues, it is because of these ingenious 
accounts taken for granted by modern scholarship that we are deceived into believing the Italian 
integration in the Roman state at the time or even prior to the Social War.    
Where Mouritsen’s arguments fail to convince is the contention that, almost immediately after the 
Social War, the political, cultural and even ethnic diversity of the allies was lost as a consequence 
of their enfranchisement: while the Italian peninsula came to constitute a ‘single political entity with 
a common citizenship’, he maintains, its former ethnic plurality was ‘largely replaced by a uniform 
Roman culture’.206 As the 1st century BCE saw the decline of indigenous Italian languages, and the 
transformation of traditional settlement patterns, these are taken as indications of the political and 
                                                          
200 Mouritsen (1998), 95. Mouritsen (2008) uses the same argument of Italians’ political and cultural distinctiveness to 
support his view of Flaccus’ citizenship extension bill of 125 BCE being an attempt to increase Roman manpower: ‘As 
soon as we accept that the allies formed a separate category with interests distinct from Rome’s, the internal balance of 
manpower between Romans and non-Romans emerges as a real political issue’, 474. 
201 Petersson (1920), 45. Arpinum gained Roman suffrage in 188 BC and was promoted to the status of a municipium in 
90 BC. 
202 Admittedly, there may have been considerable political motives behind such exhortative claims. 
203 Mouritsen (1998), 10. 
204 Mouritsen (2008), p. 473.  
205 As Appian was born in Alexandria and received the Roman citizenship through personal grant, Mouritsen sees his 
history as ‘a tribute to the greatness of the Roman Empire, presented by a grateful provincial civil servant’, Mouritsen 
(1998), 11. 
206 Ibid. 2. 
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cultural integration of the allies. Mouritsen attributes this supposed loss of local identity of Italian 
towns to their enfranchisement, as he believes that the acquisition of Roman citizenship by the 
Italian peoples did in fact contribute to their ‘becoming Roman’. Thus, in Mouritsen’s interpretation 
of the ‘Italian question’, the extension of citizenship appears to be closely tied with identity:  
Only by fully assimilating themselves, moving to Rome and seeking noble patronage 
might allied leaders enter the senatorial order. And at that stage they had effectively 
ceased to be Italians, and instead become parvi senatores living in Rome.207 
 
However, the evidence of retention of local identity in addition to the newly assumed ones stretches 
way back in time and precedes the Social War by almost a century. Quintus Ennius (c. 239 BC – c. 
169 BC) was a native of Rudiae, an Oscan town in Italy, who lived and worked in Rome and had 
become a Roman citizen in year 184 BCE. An extant fragment from his Annales reads: nos sumus 
Romani, qui fuimus ante Rudini, Fr. 525. It does not yet mean that he had ‘exchanged’ his Rudian 
identity for a Roman one.208 Rather, as a passage in Aulus Gellius informs, he was seemingly able 
to relate to multiple identities assumed as a result of his multicultural surroundings and upbringing: 
Quintus Ennius tria corda habere sese dicebat, quod loqui Graece et Osce et Latine sciret, 
17.17.1.209 The three corda here suggest something deeper than the mere ability to speak three 
different languages, and may thus be taken to mean multiple identities which, much like the 
languages referred to, could be used or displayed in specific and appropriate contexts.210 We see 
clearly from Ennius’ example that while the acquisition of Roman citizenship did imply a certain 
degree of adopting the traits of Roman identity, especially in particular settings, it need not have 
necessarily brought about an immediate loss of one’s former affiliations even upon his or her 
moving to Rome.211 The other writers and poets of Italian descent, such as Plautus from Umbria, or 
Catullus and Virgil from Cisalpine Gaul, all seem to have been perfectly aware of their regional 
affiliations, while at the same time pioneering and actively producing Latin literature in Rome.212 
Their plural identity is expressed in the praise for both their hometowns and Rome as their powerful 
‘patron’. Comparably, both Cicero and Velleius Paterculus, having made all the way up the social 
ladder and acquired senatorial status as homines novi, seem to have had similar appreciation to both 
their new position and their original ties.213  
                                                          
207 Ibid. 98.  
208 Derks & Roymans (2009): ‘That is not the way identities are usually constructed’, 160.   
209 Quintus Ennius used to say he had three hearts, because he knew how to speak in Greek, Oscan and Latin. 
210 For the close connection of language and identity, see Adams (2003). 
211 Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (2008) on Ennius’ ‘pride in being Roman’, which, ‘correctly defined by citizenship, was no 
impediment to retaining his Oscan heart’, 4. Wallace-Hadrill calls the case of Ennius ‘cultural triangulation’, i.e. ability 
to retain a local (Oscan) identity while simultaneously adopting Greek and Roman ones.  
212 Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 21. 
213 With the time of Augustus, men from Italian aristocracy were all the more able to achieve high political offices or 
magistracies in Rome, see Galsterer (1993). 
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Some historians and archaeologists argue contrary to Mouritsen’s contention too, as they are able to 
discern a considerable degree of preservation of local cultures and manifestation of regional 
identities in the post-Social War Italy.214 According to Lomas, all archaeological evidence is 
pointing to ‘a complex process of cultural interaction’ rather than ‘the development of a monolithic 
and uniform Romanized Italy’.215 The degree of adoption of Roman cultural traits varied among and 
within the local societies, the elites being significantly more prone to claiming their ‘Roman-ness’ 
than the rural population which largely ‘retained their own distinctive local identity by assimilating 
external influences and adapting them to their own needs’.216 There was most likely no immediate 
clear-cut change undergone by the Italian peoples after their enfranchisement, and the developments 
such as disappearance of indigenous languages were the result of a much longer process, one that 
took place already in the late 3rd and early 2nd centuries BCE.217 Similarly, Van Dommelen relates 
that the ability to be seen by the governor and his entourage as adopting a Roman identity may have 
been politically advantageous to the local elite of Sardinia ever since their becoming a Roman 
province in 238 BCE.218 Furthermore, military service in the allied contingents must have entailed a 
substantial degree of familiarity with Latin, especially among the local elites commanding their 
units, since at least the early 3rd century BCE.219 Latin was also a preferred language for public 
inscriptions in many of the allied communities, such as Umbria or Etruria, prior to the Social War, 
which signifies close ties with Rome and the Roman identity.220      
In her analysis of acculturation processes in Southern Italy, Kathryn Lomas made a strong case in 
favour of survival of local cultures under the guise of ‘Romanized’ communities. Although Roman 
legal and administrative structures were seemingly imposed as a prerequisite of the extension of 
Roman citizenship, the actual constitutions of Italian towns prove to be rather ‘dynamic’ and 
‘evolving systems’ which may have simultaneously involved both local and Roman elements.221 
Some cities in Magna Graecia, for instance, seem to have had both Greek and Roman constitutions 
at the same time, and certain aberrations from what could be perceived as a norm persisted well into 
                                                          
214 Lomas (1993), Laurence & Berry (1998), Van Dommelen and Terrenato (2007) et al.  
215 Lomas (1993), 187.  
216 Ibid.  
217 For instance, the language change at Cumae can be dated to as early as 180 BCE (Livy 40.42.13): Cumeans petition 
to the Senate to use Latin instead of Oscan for official business. While regular inscriptions continue to use Oscan for 
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the 2nd century CE.222 Greek elements, such as language or specific magistracies and institutions, 
survive after the Social War as functional parts of the constitution in Naples, Velia and Rhegium.223 
The research of Lomas strongly suggests that the different, Greek and Roman, elements of 
municipal constitutions and administration coexisted alongside each other, without significant 
degree of assimilation. While retaining Greek magistracies and issuing Greek decrees served ‘an 
important function in the preservation of a Greek civic identity’, the magistrates holding those 
offices worked in highly Roman-like administrative structures and had adopted Latin names, 
signalling their possession of citizenship as well as belonging to the Roman political body.224  
Surely enough, one cannot fully trust the change in naming practices to mean one’s immediate 
‘becoming Roman’, and the idea that adopting the Roman tria nomina ‘implied acceptance of 
Roman values’225 may in fact be too far-fetched. Nevertheless, the adoption of a name, much like 
the choice of language as a reaction to the change in one’s legal status, suggests (at least 
temporarily) assuming or choosing one identity over the other, it largely being a deliberate act 
meant to serve a specific purpose.226 The cultural heterogeneity of a region such as Magna Graecia 
also implies a dialogue not simply between the homogenous local and the superimposed Roman, 
but between more than two sets of cultural identities. The Greek and Latin epigraphic record, for 
instance, used in strikingly different contexts, and the Italic names appearing in both types of 
records point to the deliberate construction and negotiation of several voluntarily assumed identities 
rather than a consequential change in one’s single, ‘original’ identity. The linguistic situation in 
post-Social War Italy, thus, Lomas argues, ‘does not represent a linear progression away from the 
Italic languages and in favour of Latin, but a much more complex process in which language choice 
could reflect the political sympathies of an individual or a city’.227 From the Roman perspective too, 
there does not seem to be much evidence of deliberate attempts to impose the Latin language upon 
the Italians under the Republic nor later on during the Empire.228 The aforementioned Cumeans’ 
petition to the Roman Senate requesting the right to use Latin instead of Oscan for public business 
(see note 211 above) in 180 BCE shows that there was no encouragement, let alone insistence, by 
                                                          
222 Ibid. 144, 162. Cf. Tarentum (CIL 1(2) 590). The constitutional problems found in Magna Graecia touch upon ‘the 
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Rome that her allies were to use Latin; while the official request for this right, although it may not 
have been a legal necessity, worked as a public display of loyalty and recognition of the Roman 
authority.229  
Closely tied with the spread of Latin was the diffusion of Roman law into the allied communities. 
The Tabula Bantina may serve as a good example of the relationship between law and language, as 
well as showcase some issues of negotiation of identities. The bronze tablet comes from the 
Lucanian town of Bantia and has two types of legal text inscribed on each side: one bears a 
fragment of Roman law in Latin, while another one displays Bantian legislation written in Oscan.230 
Due to uncertain dating of the tablet, it is not entirely clear whether this piece of evidence stems 
from before or after the Social War and the consequent enfranchisement of the area in 89 BCE; it is 
also debatable what Roman legislation the Latin text is part from.231 Interestingly, the Latin part 
seems to have been inscribed and used first, while the Oscan text was added later on, thus turning 
over and reusing the original tablet.232 The Latin part of the inscription contains an oath of the 
magistrates (similar to that of the lex agraria of year 103 BCE), the procedure in case of a fine, the 
trial before the assembly, the census, the procedures in iure, and the cursus honorum.233 The Oscan 
part of the tablet is more likely to be dating to sometime after 89 BCE for it appears as part of the 
municipal statute.234 It is the most extensive inscription in the Oscan language known, yet it is 
written in the Latin alphabet which makes it unique among the rest of the extant Oscan inscriptions. 
Wallace-Hadrill describes the ‘Latin’ nature of the Tabula Bantina Osca as manifesting ‘the most 
intimate contact with Rome’: not only is the Bantian legislation inscribed on the back of a Roman 
text, but it also uses Latin script, the Roman way of writing (from left to right), adopts Latin 
terminology, and relates to Roman magistracies and legal or political institutions. Furthermore, ‘the 
very concept of inscribing laws to prescribe the constitutional basis of a community is Roman, and 
                                                          
229 Wallace-Hadrill (2008), 82. The Cumeans seemingly asked the Roman Senate to allow them ‘to speak Latin in 
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the specific topics (trials before the assembly, procedures for census of citizens, civil law 
procedures and the sequence of magistracies) were ones of current concern at Rome’.235 The Oscan 
text thus appears a lot like ‘a not-very-accurate translation from Latin’, and ‘reveals a community 
led by magistrates with Latin names such as consuls, praetors, and quaestors’.236  
Whether the law drawn up in the Oscan language belongs to the pre- or post-Social War context, its 
dependence on Rome remains unequivocal. The choice of the Bantians to inscribe their law in 
Oscan rather than Latin, however, points to the opposite development: while the adoption of Latin 
alphabet, terminology, and institutions may initially point to the loss of local cultural traits, the 
rendition of the law into Oscan manifests reassertion of the local identity.237 The spread and 
adoption of Latin did not in itself induce the disappearance of local languages and awareness of 
local identities; instead, as the case of Bantia shows, it may have encouraged the local identity to 
come to the fore through the agency of the ruling elite, most likely conversant in both Latin and 
native languages, yet making a choice to set up their legislation in the latter.238 Similarly, Laurence 
and Berry suggest that ‘there may well have been greater cultural value in maintaining localised 
identity once all Italians had been granted the citizenship of Rome’.239 Admittedly, the change in 
legal and civic practices, defined by the Roman-like municipal statutes, contributed to the 
perception of Latin as the language of power and of public inscriptions as displays of the Roman 
authority. Yet the mere acquisition of Roman citizenship did not automatically make the allies 
culturally Roman, and it may even, in some instances, have been a driving force to keep the 
localized identities alive. It is thus important to understand that the ‘culturally multilingual’, as 
Wallace-Hadrill calls those affected by yet able to adjust to the Roman domination, ‘enjoyed a 
powerful advantage rather than a loss of identity’.240 The pattern of linguistic and cultural 
manoeuvring and negotiation of identities permeates all parts of the Roman world, while active 
participation in this process does not appear to be limited to the non-Roman part of the population 
either.       
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3.2      Municipalization of Italy and the Lex (Flavia) Irnitana as an example of 
imperial municipal legislation  
 
Both the legal and civic lives of the communities that fell under the direct influence of Rome were 
largely defined by municipal or colonial legislation which followed their incorporation into the 
Roman State. We have already observed some examples of how Italian communities defined their 
new relationship to Rome. Some traits of pre-Roman administrative and legal organization were 
retained and coexisted together with the adopted Roman-like structures and principles. While some 
Italian communities may have become fundi of certain Roman laws prior to the Social War and 
their subsequent enfranchisement, the extent to which these communities were familiar with the 
Roman ius civile guiding the lives of Roman citizens, varied widely between them.241  
The municipal legislation governing the lives of newly incorporated communities were seemingly 
passed through the Roman comitia with participation of local elites, and were thus products of 
dialogue and negotiation between Rome and her subjects.242 A copy of the municipal charter 
detailing the rules of political, religious and social life of a municipium, would be inscribed on 
bronze and displayed publically.243 Its exposure in the central civic space and its availability to 
every member of the municipium played a significant role in one’s understanding of participation 
and belonging to the community, as well as defined one as a member of the Roman commonwealth 
at large, thus integrating him or her ‘symbolically as well as practically (e.g. by voting in curiae) as 
a participant in the Roman political world’.244 While the adoption of the Roman ius civile by the 
Italian communities prior to the Social War was fairly more flexible (as it depended on their choice 
to become fundi of certain laws thus abandoning those of their own), it is not entirely clear whether, 
after the enfranchisement, Rome was more active in enforcing the adoption of the ius civile and 
other universally applicable provisions in the newly created municipia, or whether this remained 
relatively optional.245  
In any case, the extent of local civil jurisdiction retained would be defined in the charter, and it was 
seemingly broader in the Late Republic than during the Early Imperial period. There clearly was no 
                                                          
241 From close to nothing at Samnium to close acquaintance (marriage, inheritance, business affairs) in Latin colonies, 
Bispham (2007), 205.  
242 Bispham (2007) comments on the relation between draftsmen of municipal laws and principes of local communities: 
the former were ‘men with links to and interests in the communities, but also who understood politics at Rome’, 245. 
The fact that municipal leges were voted by the Roman people demonstrates a ‘powerful link between centre and 
periphery’, so that the communities without municipal laws may have found themselves ‘politically and culturally 
isolated’, ibid.   
243 Bispham (2007), 206.  
244 Ibid. 223-4. 
245 Ibid. 206. 
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one hundred percent continuity of the old ways anywhere in Italy, but the two spheres of 
jurisdiction (the local and the praetorian) at work should most likely be seen as complementary 
rather than competing with or opposing to one another.246 The process of municipalisation was thus 
‘flexible enough to incorporate local tradition along with a significant core of Roman standards’.247 
Furthermore, some, if not most of the Italian communities were already to a certain degree familiar 
with Roman law (through military service, business opportunities, tax farming, and the voluntary 
adoption of beneficial laws), a development of interaction which must have been well known in 
Rome. Bispham maintains that the Roman Senate seemingly had ‘expected that absorption of the 
principles of criminal and civil law was one of the main functions of acculturation, and that 
guidance was only necessary for some of the more tricky aspects of procedure in iure or apud 
iudicem’.248  
We know somewhat more of later, imperial municipal legislation, which retains the main traits of 
Republican municipal charters but seemingly displays a higher degree of conformity with the 
Roman law and administrative practices. The Lex Irnitana, an extant piece of Flavian municipal 
legislation originating in the municipium Flavium Irnitanum in Spain and traditionally dated to 91 
CE, is one of the most interesting legal sources found to this day and may serve here as an example 
of imperial city-laws. It’s similarities with the Lex Salpensana and the Lex Malacitana (82-84 CE) 
prove the existence of a single ‘matrix-law’ lying behind all the Flavian municipal legislation, parts 
of which would be adjusted according to each particular case.249 Since municipium Flavium 
Irnitanum was a Latin community (granted the ius Latium in year 73/74 CE together with the whole 
of Spain), one should not safely assume that the same ‘matrix-law’ applied to the Italian 
communities of the Late Republic as well. The city-law does, nevertheless, contain some provisions 
dating back to the Republican times, as well as ‘reflects the legislative concerns of the Augustan 
age’.250  
The Lex Irnitana discusses general administrative matters, such as magistracies held, elections, 
financial and religious matters etc., with its longest section concerning jurisdiction (84-93).251 The 
                                                          
246 Ibid. n. 67, 423.  
247 Ibid. 245. Similarly, Kantor (2012) maintains that ‘municipal copies of Roman laws represent a potpourri of 
provisions from different statutes, mixed together without much forethought’, 71. He compares this development to the 
attitude of the Roman jurists in the sense that they both point toward fluidity and flexibility of interpretation of the law.   
248 Ibid. 223.  
249 Galsterer (1988), 78. Bispham (2007) speculates that there was either one or two (colonial and municipal) matrix-
laws which these chapters could draw on, and maintains that either way ‘there was a considerable degree of fluidity 
both in its evolution, and in its application to particular communities’, 228.  
250 Metzger (2013), 10. Gonzales (1986) on part of the Augustan Lex Iulia de iudiciis privatis which seems to be 
‘incorporated in a set of regulations for municipia, if not immediately, surely still by Augustus’, 150. 
251 The beginning of the law is not preserved but it must have started with the definition of the citizen body (and, 
possibly, their munera). The rest of its contents may be summarized as follows: religious affairs; magistrates (to 27); 
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latter is preserved intact and was righteously held by Gonzales to be ‘the most dramatic section’ of 
the entire material.252 A part from this section regarding the law according to which ‘a matter may 
be judged, a case may be at the peril of the iudex, a matter may cease to be under trial’, reads:  
<…> the statute and law and position is to be as it would be if a praetor of the Roman 
people had ordered that matter to be judged in the city of Rome between Roman citizens, 
(91).253 
Similarly, a subsequent paragraph ‘concerning the law of the municipes’ holds:   
On whatever matters there is no explicit provision or rule in this statute, concerning the 
law under which the municipes of the Municipium Flavium Irnitanum should deal with 
each other, they are to deal with each other in all these matters under the civil law under 
which Roman citizens deal or will deal with each other, (93). 
 
There are a couple of important points one should immediately establish. Firstly, not all of the 
municipes of Irni were Roman citizens: while the majority of members of the community possessed 
the ius Latium, it is most likely only a small number of the ruling elite members that had access to 
full Roman citizen rights.254 Secondly, there are no specific provisions differentiating between the 
Roman and non-Roman citizens in the sections regarding the administration of justice, which is the 
most intriguing (to this paper) part. Non-Romans (Latins) were authorized by this statute to make 
use of a number of Roman laws, including the Roman private law institutions as if they were 
Roman citizens (23, 85, 93). The Lex Irnitana thus demonstrates that in the 1st century CE most of 
the ‘exclusively Roman’ private law institutions (patria potestas (21), manus (86), mancipium (97), 
manumissio, tutela, ius liberorum, the tria nomina etc.) were made available to the Latin municipes 
in Spain regardless of their possession of citizenship and their formal eligibility for making use of 
these institutions.255 Their subsequent change of status from Latin to Roman would thus no longer 
affect their legal relationships enshrined in the municipal legislation of Irni.256 From the 
administrative perspective too there was a compulsion to adhere to the Roman practices in terms of 
eligibility for office (54), bearing of witness (71), granting of trial (89), conduct of trial (91) etc.   
Chapter (93) provides that no local rules were to be followed or applied (contra Gellius NA 16.13.6-
9) unless specifically indicated in the municipal law. Local jurisdiction appears to be retained in 
fields of payments to scribes, actors, and ambassadors (70-73), inspection of sources of revenue 
(76), or expenditure on sacra (77); in a couple of places we also see adherence to the traditional 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
manumission and tutela (28-29); decuriones (30-31); elections (51-60); general administration (61-62); financial 
matters (62-73); illegal gatherings and grain hoarding (74-75); further section on financial matters (76-80); games, 
roads and operae (81-83); jurisdiction (84-93); incolae, inscribing of the law and its enforcement (94-96).  
252 Gonzales (1986), 148.  
253 Here and further the law is cited from Gonzales (1986). See ibid. for the edition of Latin text and critical apparatus. 
254 Bispham (2007): ‘hence the ‘didactic’ and acculturative functions of the charter were perhaps greater than would 
have been the case in a Roman municipium’, 211.  
255 Cf. Gaius on patria potestas and tutelage of women as ‘peculiarly’ Roman institutions, defining the ‘Romanity’ of 
citizenship holders, see Ch.1.1.  
256 Gardner (1993), 189. 
56 
 
custom of the community, e.g. regarding the local festivals and games (81).257 For all else, however, 
the municipes of Irni were to deal with each other within the framework of Roman civil law, and 
local judges were instructed to give judgement according to what would apply if the case was tried 
at Rome and between the Roman citizens (71, 89, 91).258 Precisely because of these hypothetical 
provisions, the law that the municipes of Irni were to apply in their dealings was an ‘artificial 
construct’ or ‘legal fiction’.259 What we see in the Lex Irnitana is then neither the retention of local 
autonomy nor imposition of pure Roman law. Instead, this should be seen as a creation of a new 
legal system based on Roman law yet able to ‘accommodate’ peregrines as ‘pretend-Romans’.260 
The bestowal of such a system demonstrates the purest form of redefinition of local set of civic and 
legal relations through the medium of municipal charter: the implications of such ‘legal fiction’ on 
the locals’ legal and civic identities must have been significant too.  
Yet another noteworthy aspect of such legislation is that it was only valid within the individual 
community.261 This primarily meant that while a member of the municipium of Irni could freely 
make use of Roman private law institutions in his hometown, they would no longer apply to him or 
her in their dealings elsewhere. From the legal perspective, at least, communities like that of Irni 
were designed to look and behave like tiny replicas of Rome herself, with every member of its 
community well aware of their legal rights and obligations. The regulations on publication of the 
charter (95) too show the ‘importance of the law as a public document, and as an accessible source 
of authority within the community’.262 Although such close adherence of the Spanish municipia to 
Roman law and administration of justice was most likely an imperial development, the Republican 
municipal legislation may have contained references to the Roman practice in cases of doubt similar 
to the one in the Lex Irnitana (93): ‘If the Italian municipal charters of the Republic were half as 
complex and wide-ranging as the Flavian charters from Spain’, Bispham speculates, ‘they will have 
had a very significant impact on the life of the municipia’.263  
Both the limited local jurisdiction and the extension of the Roman ius civile to non-Roman (Latin) 
communities demonstrate that the possession of citizenship was no longer a necessary prerequisite 
for exercising Roman private law. Although we have seen Gellius explain that municipia, in 
contrast to coloniae, were largely able to retain their own laws and customs (NA 16.13.6), he also 
                                                          
257 Gonzales (1986), 149. 
258 Gonzales (1986) remarks on the purely Roman nature of chapters on jurisdiction (84-93) thus concluding that ‘the 
study of the relationship of Reichsrecht and Volksrecht will clearly never be the same again’, 149.  
259 Gardner (1993) calls this ‘a mirage of the Roman law’, 188-9. 
260 Ibid. 190. A similar ‘legal fiction’ we have already seen in the previously discussed Lex Acilia de repetundis (49): 
‘He shall have the right of appeal to the Roman people thereafter, just as if he were a Roman citizen’.  
261 See Gardner (1993), 189. 
262 Bispham (2007), 223.  
263 Ibid. 93, 210. 
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tells us that there were municipia which, to Hadrian’s surprise, had requested to have their status 
changed into that of a colony.264 Gellius explains such requests as follows: 
the condition [of a colony], although it is more exposed to control and less free, is 
nevertheless thought preferable and superior because of the greatness and 
majesty of the Roman people, of which those colonies seem to be miniatures, as it 
were, and in a way copies; and at the same time because the rights (iura) of the 
municipal towns become obscure and invalid, and from ignorance of their 
existence the townsmen are no longer able to make use of them.265 
 
The municipal communities in mid-2nd century CE were seemingly less and less aware of their own 
iura, most likely due to their close relations to Rome, especially among the elite members, and 
familiarity with the Roman law, communicated to them through the Roman-style municipal 
charters. Roman legal principles and institutions thus seem to have gradually become the ‘easiest’ 
point of reference for these communities. Gellius’ contention, as we shall presently see, may to 
some extent be applicable to the provincial situation of the 2nd century CE too: people’s willingness 
to assert their rights and secure legal protection came to influence their perception of the Roman 
governor’s court as the only one able to solve the disputes stemming from the plurality of laws.  
 
3.3 Roman provincial situation of the 2nd century CE  
 
The spread of Roman law and the extension of Roman citizenship were not limited to Italy and the 
surrounding communities affected by the process of municipalization. In fact, most of the first-hand 
documentary evidence to throw light on the various legal transactions, litigation and court 
proceedings within the framework of Roman law come down to us from the (Eastern) provinces of 
the Empire. Contrary to municipal or colonial communities whose legal and civic lives were 
defined by official charters drawn upon their acquisition of municipal (colonial) status, the legal 
relations within the provinces depended on the provincial edict which was subject to annual change 
(see Ch. 1.2). Together with the Roman administrative apparatus, introduced into the newly 
established provinces shortly after their acquisition, came the implementation of the Roman judicial 
system. This was a process influenced by the presence of Roman military force, numbers of Roman 
                                                          
264 Hadrianus … peritissime disseruit mirarique se ostendit quod et ipsi Italicenses et quaedam item alia municipia 
antiqua, in quibus Uticenses nominat, cum suis moribus legibusque uti possent, in ius coloniarum mutari gestiverint, 
NA 16.13.4. The request of Utica was not granted until Septimius Severus (r. 193-211 CE). An opposite request of 
Praeneste to change its status from a colony to that of munipium under Tiberius is attested to have been successful (NA 
16.13.5).    
265 Quae tamen condicio, cum sit magis obnoxia et minus libera, potior tamen et praestabilior existimatur propter 
amplitudinem maiestatemque populi Romani, cuius istae coloniae quasi effigies parvae simulacraque esse quaedam 
videntur, et simul quia obscura oblitterataque sunt municipiorum iura, quibus uti iam per ignotitiam non queunt, NA 
16.13.9.  
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citizens sent out to live in the newly acquired dominions, and the gradual increase in citizenship 
grants provided to pro-Roman provincials as a gesture of gratitude or an implicit request for loyalty. 
Thus, the primary reason behind the spread of Roman law into the provinces was to provide the 
Roman citizens residing outside Rome with a proper, i.e. Roman, set of legal remedies. Once there, 
the Roman administration of justice seemingly came to influence local legal relations to some 
extent too, as the indigenous people could and did have regular recourse to the Roman courts.  
Most of the people we meet in the provincial documentary evidence are not Roman citizens, nor do 
they belong to a particular, presumably wealthier, part of the population. Instead, they are provincial 
inhabitants of differing social and cultural backgrounds, negotiating their place in a fairly complex 
legal environment and ready to go to considerable lengths in asserting their rights within the 
framework of Roman provincial law. The legal disputes of which we read in the papyri mostly have 
to do with private matters, such as disputes over property or personal injury. In litigation relating to 
personal and family law we often find claims based on local legal principles that are nevertheless 
addressed to a Roman court. The Roman administrators of justice were not blind to requests based 
on local law and they would in a lot of cases try to adjudicate the case without impairing the local 
legal relations. Hence, the law actually practiced in the Roman provincial courts proves to be far 
from monolithic: the principle of legal personality largely applied throughout the provinces Empire-
wide.266  
Roman law was thus only one of the many enforceable laws and, in most regions, legal complexity 
(plurality of laws) prevailed. In Roman Egypt, for instance, the Greek cities had retained their own 
municipal laws which were decisive in cases brought by the members of their citizenry.267 Local 
courts were in most cases retained as well, although often with limited jurisdiction. However, 
evidence has it that the governor’s court was perceived by both the residing Romans and native 
inhabitants as the highest judicial authority on the provincial level. What is frequently obscured by 
the debate over the relationship between local and Roman laws (‘Volksrecht’ vs. ‘Reichsrecht’) is 
that, most likely, it was not so much about which (Roman or local) law to address in your claim but 
rather which judicial authority to trust the matter to. Surely, not every case could reach the court of 
the governor, and in majority of cases a local magistrate with judicial powers would be the first and 
the last point of contact for a common provincial. Nevertheless, people’s willingness to assert their 
                                                          
266 In Roman Egypt, for instance, we see both Roman and local (Greek, Egyptian) laws applicable in the Roman courts, 
together with regulations valid for smaller groups, e.g. Jews, Katzoff (1972), 292.  
267 Cf. P.Oxy.2199 (3rd cent. CE Egypt): the claimant’s right to inherit land was put to test by a local official due to his 
doubts of her eligibility for the legal remedy based in Alexandrian (or Antinoite) municipal  law; the nome strategos 
was asked to investigate whether Areia (the claimant) possessed the citizenship of the Greek city in question. The 
document thus not only proves the citizenship of a certain polis to be forming the basis for the woman’s capacity to 
inherit, but also demonstrates that municipal law was in this case considered to be decisive. See Taubenschlag (1951), 
128.  
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rights by securing a hearing before the highest judicial instance proves to have been of considerable 
scale: P.Yale 1.61 (209 CE), for instance, records the prefect of Egypt receiving 1,804 petitions 
from a single Arsinoite district during his annual assizes. Judging by the overwhelming amount of 
petitions addressed to the prefect, these clearly came from both the commoners and the upper 
classes alike.268 Similarly to Egypt, in Roman Arabia the provincials are often seen to have traced 
down and tried to approach the governor too, instead of having recourse to local courts or arbiters 
(P.Yadin 26, l.5; P.Yadin 25, ll. 15-16, 42-3). The evidence from Egypt and other (mostly Eastern) 
provinces thus shows provincials’ readiness to address Roman authorities and use them for dispute 
resolution regardless of their own ethnicity, social status, or even possession of citizenship. To what 
extent then, if at all, did the spread of Roman law influence local identities and local legal/civic 
relations in the regions further away from and less dependent on Rome?    
a. Linguistic change   
 
One of the most easily perceivable developments stemming from the implementation of Roman law 
and administrative apparatus and pertaining to the question of identity is the change in language 
use.269 The linguistic identity of subjected peoples was inevitably redefined by the advent of Roman 
administrative and legal systems. Similarly to the post-Social War Italy, Latin became a 
predominant language of official business in the Western parts of the Empire (Britain, Gaul, Spain, 
Dacia), while the linguistic variety in the East was widely replaced by Greek as an official language 
of the new government. The survival or disappearance of local languages, however, was not a 
unanimous process throughout the Empire and depended heavily on native choices as well as 
governmental policy.270  
While Demotic script was still used for legal purposes under the Ptolemies, both epigraphic and 
documentary evidence from Roman Egypt reveals a severe decline in its use within the first century 
of the Roman rule, and its gradual confinement to religious and literary spheres only. The final 
entrenchment of Greek under the Roman rule mainly owes to the legal and administrative changes, 
such as the abandonment of the court of laokritai operating with Demotic contracts, and the 
                                                          
268 Cf. Bryen (2008), 185. 
269 Language is often seen as one of the key components constituting one’s personal identity, along with ethnicity, 
customs, religion etc. See Mattingly (2011), Adams (2003).   
270 Cf. Woolf (1998) who discusses the survival of Romance languages in southern Wales and interprets it as a 
deliberate choice of elite to ‘become more Roman’, as they perceived it. He also stresses the capacity of rather small 
numbers of elite groups to influence the adoption of Roman culture, 111-124.   
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elaboration of institutions of agoronomeia and grapheia.271 Demotic legal documents were still 
drawn during the Roman period in the most conservative areas of law, such as family, inheritance 
and succession matters. The Romans did, nevertheless, impose various complications and 
regulations for this type of contracts, for instance, they required a Greek subscription and were 
considered invalid unless registered in the special archive in Alexandria. Both Roman and peregrine 
residents of Egypt largely drew their contracts in Greek and followed Greek formulaic 
requirements, except where Roman law explicitly demanded of Roman citizens to use Latin. In the 
judicial proceedings too, the native population of Egypt was bound to use Greek, regardless of their 
knowledge of the language: PSI 1362 (181-183 CE) contains a court minute which records an 
Egyptian answering in the court of the Roman prefect with the help of an interpreter. Naturally, the 
portion of the provincial population to actually find themselves in need of attending governor’s 
court must have been fairly small, and most people would lead their lives without having to go 
through too much trouble. Yet the inability to legally transact in one’s native language, as well as 
the acquisition and use of documents drawn in a foreign tongue must have affected many and at all 
social levels.    
In comparison, Roman Arabia posits another example of linguistic change undergone by the native 
population shortly after its acquisition in 106 CE. Although, contrary to Egypt, the area had not 
been deeply affected by prior Hellenization, we see an almost immediate shift from Nabataean 
language to Greek, alongside the very rapid adoption of Roman documentary practices.272 Out of 
the 35 papyri (dating from 93/94 to 132 CE) found in the archive of Babatha, a local Jewish woman 
from a rather wealthy family, 3 are drawn in Aramaic, 6 in Nabataean, while 17 are in Greek 
language, and 9 in Greek with subscriptions and signatures in Aramaic, Nabataean or both.273 The 
linguistic change here thus directly relates to the Roman annexation and reveals a similar pattern to 
that of Egypt, although, unlike Demotic, Aramaic script remained in use and there are no 
indications of its invalidity in court. Of particular interest in the said archive are the trilingual 
documents, such as the land registration by Babatha issued in connection with a census return 
                                                          
271 For the separation of jurisdictions of the two (Greek and Egyptian) courts based on the language of the documents, 
see the decree of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II (118 BCE). See Yiftach-Firanko (2009) on the Greek language in Roman 
Egypt, 549. 
272 The Greek that we see in the documents from Roman Arabia is often grammatically incorrect (e.g. omitted definite 
Greek articles) and permeated with Latinisms, translations (e.g. bona fide (=kale pistei, ek kales pisteos) and 
transliterations of Latin legal and administrative terms, such as acta, basilica, collega, librarius, miliarius, praesidium. 
Shortly after 106 CE in both Greek and Aramaic documents we already see the use of consular dating (i); references to 
parts of Roman administration (ii); adoption of Latin titles, Roman customs and Latinized names (iii); the use of 
typically Roman phrases such as ‘most blessed days of emperor …’ (v) etc. In addition, 23 out of 35 documents found 
in the archive are the so-called ‘double documents’, i.e. two waxed tablets tied together in a Roman diplomata fashion.    
273 For a fuller discussion of subscriptions in these documents, see Cotton (1995). 
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ordered by the Roman governor.274 The main body of the document was written by Babatha’s 
husband (acting as her transactional guardian, thus in accordance with Roman law) in Aramaic; to 
this a Greek translation was added and, once approved by a Roman official, a Latin notation was 
appended, with its parallel translation into Greek. The original, i.e. Aramaic, version of the 
document, together with the notation in Latin, was displayed in public, thus demonstrating both the 
importance of Latin for validation of the document and one’s ability to nonetheless employ the 
native language to his or her convenience.275  
While certain requirements of the Roman administration regarding documentary practices, 
including the language of documents admitted to court, were imposed throughout the Empire, there 
clearly was no official policy to govern one’s personal linguistic choices. The epigraphic evidence 
from the Near East suggests the coexistence of local languages with those brought about by the 
Roman administration. A couple of funerary inscriptions set up in the 1st c. CE in Lepcis 
(Tripolitania, Libya) and dedicated to a certain Boncar Clodius son of Mecrasius and his mother are 
inscribed in Latin, Greek and neo-Punic.276 Instead of being taken to mean the intrusion or 
superimposition of Latin and Greek as the official languages of the Roman government, the 
trilingual aspect of these inscriptions informs of one’s desire to assert several un-contradictory 
identities. Funerary inscriptions, it must be pointed out, served no less public a purpose than any 
other type of epigraphic display: an inscription was primarily meant to be read and interpreted by 
the others, and Boncar Clodius made sure that his would be read by at least three linguistic groups 
of people which he had identified with during his lifetime.277 Both literary and epigraphic evidence 
of the 2nd century CE too reveal a common practice of code-switching, i.e. ability to use two or 
more different languages depending on circumstance, especially among the Greek elites in various 
parts of the Empire.278 This linguistic model of appropriating two or more languages instead of 
creating a ‘hybrid’ one reminds us of the bilingualism in the 3rd-2nd century BCE Italy, and once 
again points to the coexistence of different cultures, and a conscious ‘shuttle’ between various 
identities rather than their fusion.279 In this regard, the frequently accentuated disparity between the 
                                                          
274 P.Yadin.16, 127 CE.  
275 Adams (2003) sees the former as proof for Latin taking up the status of the ‘language of power’, 566-7. The 
trilingual documents from Arabia reveal the hierarchical relationship between demands of the state and one’s personal 
preferences: in many cases, Aramaic text would be issued for personal use, Greek for local administration of justice, 
and Latin for the official recognition (validation) of the document.  
276 IRT 654, 655.  
277 Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (2008) on the same inscription of Boncar as he notes that the recorded multilingualism ‘does not 
make him a Creole, but someone conscious of several identities’, 14.  
278 Ibid. 6.  
279 Wallace-Hadrill (2008), drawing heavily on Swain (1996) and Goldhill (2001), notes that ‘the Roman world 
produces no evidence of Creole languages, but abundant evidence of bilingualism and code-switching, and at all social 
levels’, 13.  
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Republican imposition of ‘Romanity’ and the Imperial policy of ‘non-intrusion’ proves to be less 
pronounced too.       
In fact, there does not seem to have been any official or universal insistence on Latin as the single 
language of the Roman Empire. This, as duly noted by Adams, becomes especially clear in the 
context of the Roman employment of Greek as the ‘twin language’ for business and administration. 
Nevertheless, as we have observed in the case of Babatha’s transactions, Latin often served as the 
language of validation and authority, regardless of whether or not the addressees understood it. The 
instances of using Latin in the predominantly Greek or any other non-Latin speaking environment 
by the Roman officials was thus their way of asserting their own identity as well as communicating 
Rome’s overarching power.280  
A slightly different story than that of regular provincials applies for those in possession of the 
Roman citizenship. Although Rome did not officially demand that her citizens should speak Latin 
and, taking into account numerous citizenship extensions throughout the Empire, it would be absurd 
to believe that all of them did; there is evidence that the newly made citizens, at least those circling 
in the highest echelons at Rome, were frequently expected to know the language of the Romans.281 
There is ample provincial record to demonstrate that the acquisition of Roman citizenship implied 
adoption of Latin in the legal discourse pertinent to personal and family law. As mentioned above, 
certain types of documents directly related to the assertion and transmission of Roman citizen 
status, such as birth certificates and wills, had to be drawn in Latin regardless of whether or not the 
holders of the civitas knew the language.282 It was, as Adams righteously maintains, a practice ‘rich 
in symbolism’, and one which necessarily implied assumption of a new identity, not only juridical 
but also linguistic. The principle of mutual understanding, however, seemingly applied to these 
documents too, and is articulated through their linguistic complexity: e.g. the citizen will in Latin 
would often have a subscription in Greek (assuming the testator was a Greek speaker) and would be 
accompanied by a Greek translation.283 While the Greek copies of such documents would have no 
legal validity in court, their issue for personal reference demonstrates an attempt against the 
                                                          
280 Adams (2003), 545-6. 
281 Ibid. 562. Tiberius is attested to have refused to allow a centurion speak Greek in the senate (D.C. 57.15.3; Suet. Tib. 
71), while Claudius forbade non-citizens usurping Roman names for their children and is known to have stripped a 
Greek of the Roman citizenship on the grounds that he could not speak Latin (Suet. Claud. 16.2). Claudius’ latter action 
in general contradicts the principle postulated by Cicero, namely, that a Roman citizen could not forfeit his citizenship 
without his own consent (cf. Caec. 100 on exile), see Harries (2006), 147. Claudius’ aberration from this principle may 
have to do not only with the altered imperial policy (namely, the hegemony of the emperor over citizenship extension) 
but also with the idea that foreigners admitted to the Roman civitas were still perceived as ‘second-class’ citizens. 
282 Adams (2003) informs that such requirement was valid until Alexander Severus (r. 222-235), 564. 
283 Cf. P.Oxy.52.3692; P.Oxy.38.2857; P.Oxy.22.2348. 
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impairment of linguistic identity.284 The newly made citizens, even though able to maintain their 
native tongue in most of their legal and business transactions (either in the original or in a copy), 
would nevertheless ‘have been aware that a linguistic demand was being made of them which 
symbolized the authority that Rome exercised over their lives, and the obligations carried by 
possession of the citizenship’.285 The linguistic policy of the Roman government was in general 
more rigorously felt by the smaller portion of provincial population that was admitted to the Roman 
citizenry, and it mainly had to do with the prerequisites of Roman law.286 Possession of the Roman 
citizenship and the use of specifically Roman legal institutions were thus to some degree perceived 
as intrinsically connected with the Latin language, at least until the mid-3rd century CE.   
A final question to be considered in relation to linguistic policies of the Romans is the extent to 
which legal documents can be used as evidence in discussing identity, given the high rate of 
illiteracy across the Empire. Not only were the majority of people we meet in the provincial record 
non-citizens, but a considerable portion of them were illiterate in both Latin and Greek, and 
sometimes in their own native tongue too. The aforementioned Babatha was most likely among the 
latter as well (P.Yadin 15), yet her illiteracy does not seem to have impaired her rather vigorous 
legal activity. Furthermore, her possession of the 3 Greek copies of a peculiarly Roman law action 
(actio tutelae, P.Yadin 28-30, 125 CE) demonstrates that her inability to read the actio did not 
influence her comprehension of its meaning. In a similar vein, Skoda discusses the lesser degrees of 
literacy in relation to law only to conclude that ‘in many cases full comprehension of a given text or 
document was not the point so much as the role of that text or document as an object’. Instead of 
one’s ability to read, the no less operative concept may have been mere legibility, i.e. ‘ensuring that 
a predetermined meaning can be extracted from the texts’.287 Babatha’s copies of a Roman law 
action were perceived as important because their primary purpose was to ensure the legal protection 
of her underage child. Similarly, the possession of a Latin will by a non-Latin speaking citizen gave 
him assurance that his property will nevertheless be protected by Roman law and properly 
transferred to his heirs. 
 
 
                                                          
284 In Roman Egypt, we even find Greek copies of Latin documents which employ Egyptian dating – a practice absent 
from Latin documents (or Greek translations of Latin documents) as these were bound to use consular dating. For a 
fuller discussion see Adams (2003), 568-9.   
285 Ibid. 562-3. 
286 Ibid. 570-1. 
287 Skoda (2012), 46. 
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b. The knowledge of law  
 
What Babatha’s possession of the specifically Roman legal instrument shows, is a considerable 
degree of familiarity with Roman law within the area shortly after its formal acquisition. Given both 
her illiteracy and non-citizen status, it becomes all the more plausible that the knowledge of law 
among the provincials had to do with the availability of legal advice. We have already noted on the 
prevalent use of local legal experts by the Roman provincial administration: especially valuable 
must have been those conversant in both the language of administration (either Greek or Latin) and 
local tongue, as well as familiar with both Roman and local legal practices (Ch. 1.3).288 These 
experts would be equally relied on by the Roman administration on points of local law 
(P.Oxy.2.237; P.Oxy.36.2757; P.Oxy.42.3015), and by the provincials on the peculiarities of Roman 
law (P.Yadin 28-30; Gaius’ Inst.1.191).289 The transmission, availability and use of Roman legal 
literature in the provinces, Kantor convincingly speculates, may have also been a fairly early 
development, influenced to some extent by the agency of the growing milieu of legal experts.290 
One should, of course, bear in mind that while these experts assisted the governor and his 
entourage, the majority of municipal magistrates and juries who would normally judge cases 
brought to a regular court most likely had very few or no legal advisers at hand.291 Hence, their 
evident lack of knowledge of Roman law, as well as the locals’ strive towards presenting their case 
before a higher judicial authority. 
In his discussion of the knowledge of law in Roman Asia Minor, Kantor draws one’s attention to 
the relevant evidence in Pliny’s correspondence with Trajan. The documents produced by the 
litigants in governor’s court demonstrate considerable degree of distribution of Roman legal 
enactments as well as their availability to provincials: Ep. 10.31, 10.56, 10.58 and 10.68 all show 
litigants’ access to documents relevant to each particular case. In some instances, the imperial 
pronouncements provided in Pliny’s court stem from other provinces and do not directly apply to 
Bithynia/Pontus, a practice which points to circulation of province-specific enactments between 
                                                          
288 Kantor (2012) has made a valid observation that legal studies became an ‘independent professional field’ in the 
Greek-speaking world only with the coming of the Romans, and that ‘the connection between legal studies and the 
wider sphere of elite education is very pronounced in the Greek East of the imperial period’, 62-63. Similarly, Skoda 
(2012) maintains that ‘the growing use of experts and their training hints at the entanglement of legalism with the 
growth of states’, 48.  
289 See Kantor (2009), 262-5 for these and more examples.   
290 The attested transmission of Roman legal enactments between different provinces also contributed to the unification 
of Roman provincial law, ibid. 264-5. 
291 Cf. Galsterer (1986) on the idea that most of these local magistrates were appointed from local elites where they used 
to hold political, social, and economic power prior to the Roman domination, which makes their interest in effecting 
legal changes highly unlikely, 20-21.  
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different regions.292 In other instances, the copies of legal enactments produced by the provincials 
appear to be unknown to Pliny himself, which makes him consult with Trajan not only about their 
applicability but also their authenticity (10.65.3). Trajan’s replies often reveal his own uncertainty 
regarding the application and validity of these enactments or legal remedies as well.293  
Since legal practice in the first centuries CE entailed a considerable degree of personal contact, 
Kantor maintains that one’s access to necessary documents was likely to have been a ‘very personal 
affair, dependent on social connections’.294 The situations in Pliny as well as in provincial 
documentary record shows that Roman law, at least its parts which were not confined to the Roman 
citizenry, were increasingly more relied on by the common provincials, including those outside the 
privileged groupings.295 The Roman legal instruments appear alongside non-Roman ones and both 
are perceived as equally operative in the provincial legal environment. Whether or not the spread of 
Roman legal institutions was intended as a message of ‘acculturation’ and power, and whether it 
was understood as such by the provincial population, remains uncertain.    
c. Native agency and legal manoeuvring296  
 
The factor of knowledge and accessibility of legal advice comes hand in hand with the concept of 
agency. For instance, the importance of citizenship outside Rome and preferential treatment of 
certain social groups and legal categories encouraged manipulation of status and legal manoeuvring. 
This is especially evident in Roman Egypt, where citizenship was a key to attributing one’s legal 
identity.297 BGU 3.747, for instance, written before 139 CE, is a letter from the strategos of the 
Koptite district complaining to the prefect about the Romans, Alexandrians, and the enfranchised 
veterans in his district who refused to support him in his duties. Although the prefect replies in 
favour of the strategos, the document nevertheless points to the tendency of privileged (either 
Roman or Greek) citizens to abuse their status.298 Yet another papyrus from 63 CE (FIRA 3.171) 
records a delegation of veteran soldiers complaining about their rights as Roman citizens being 
                                                          
292 Ibid. 259. 
293 Cf. 10.66.2: epistulae sane sunt Domitiani ad Avidium Nigrinum et Armenium Brocchum, quae fortasse debeant 
observari: sed inter eas provincias, de quibus rescripsit, non est Bithynia.  
294 Kantor (2009), 259; Liebs (2001), 238.  
295 Kantor (2012), 79. 
296 Some documents and arguments relating to Roman Egypt and Roman Arabia in the present sub-chapter have been 
discussed by the author in the two research papers written for seminars on ‘Romanization: Acculturation Processes in 
the Provinces of the Roman Empire’ (2012/2013) and ‘Graeco-Roman Egypt: a multicultural society’ (2013/2014).    
297 Fischer-Bovet (2013), 14.   
298 Jördens (2012), 252. Similarly, there is evidence of some military veterans who received the citizenship of 
Antinoopolis along with the Roman, but preferred to stay at their old places of residence. Jördens summarizes this to 
conclude that these veterans were in constant conflicts with local authorities who would often doubt the privileges of 
Antinoite citizenship or ignore them all together. 
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overridden. The emphasis in these petitions is laid on citizenship and the benefits that came along 
with it: civic privilege and rights come forward in the provincial legal discourse, together with the 
concepts of status and power.  
Nevertheless, in the majority of cases Roman citizens prove to be fully integrated into the daily life 
of the provinces, legal matters included. In sharp contrast to litigation in Rome, the Roman citizens 
residing in Egypt, along with the rest of its population, were seemingly relatively free to choose in 
what form and to which judge to recourse, both in a dispute between themselves and with the 
peregrines.299 If in the Ptolemaic times we see a pattern of Greeks, especially women, attempting to 
use Egyptian forms of contracts and follow Egyptian legal practices due to their more lenient and 
beneficial nature; in the Roman period predominantly Greek (Hellenistic) law is addressed by the 
majority of Egypt’s population, including Roman citizens.300 The legal environment and activity of 
the provincials in the periphery of Rome mainly demonstrate that the observance of and appeal to 
certain laws were matters of deliberate agency rather than coercion, and that the most important 
principle determining one’s choice was the level of protection that he or she could secure.      
This can be illustrated by the enthusiastic adoption of some of the specifically Roman legal 
institutions once their application was extended to non-Romans. The lex Plaetoria de minoribus 
protecting legal minors was seemingly accessible to the peregrine wards in Egypt, as well as the 
institute of the cura minorum (P.Oxy.3.487, 156 CE). Several other papyri record peregrine women 
making use of the Roman ius liberorum, i.e. woman’s entitlement to legal independence provided 
she has three or more children:  P.Hamb.1.16 (209 CE) and P.Strassb.3.150 (182-215 CE) both 
refer to the privilege by using the same Greek formula χωρὶ ὰ tὰ Ῥωµaίων ἔθη tέκνων dικaίῳ 
<…>.301 In the field of the (procedural) law of succession too we see the reception of Roman legal 
forms by non-Romans, e.g. the provisions of the Lex Iulia vicesimaria on the official opening of a 
testament in the presence of six witnesses were largely adopted by the peregrines, even though not 
required.302   
Similar instances of legal manoeuvring are discernable in Roman Arabia too. Isaac, referring to the 
Greek marriage contract (P.Yadin 18, 128 CE) from the Babatha archive, maintains that ‘if Jews in 
Arabia preferred Greco-Roman marriage contracts to traditional ketubbot, the most likely 
explanation is that the former offered advantages that had been unavailable under the Nabataean 
                                                          
299 Ibid. 
300 Except, naturally, the matters of law of persons, family, and succession, see Wolff (2002), 153-62. Manipulation of 
laws was in general a fairly common practice in the multicultural societies of the ancient world: P. dem. Lille II.76, 77, 
84, 95, and P.Petrie III 58e all demonstrate Greek families living in the villages of Ptolemaic Egypt and making use of 
Demotic surety contracts. See Clarysse (1992), 54.   
301 [woman’s name] transacting in business without the guardian according to the Roman custom of the ius liberorum.  
302 Yiftach-Firanko (2009), 553-4. 
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rule’.303 This notion becomes all the more plausible when we take into account that some of the 
documents in the said archive, especially those drawn up in indigenous languages and dating shortly 
before the Roman rule, were clearly designed to be used in the local courts, which are very unlikely 
to have been completely abandoned with the advent of the Roman rule.304 It was more likely 
opportunistic behaviour combined with recognition of supreme authority that determined the 
choices of Babatha and her relatives.   
The formal and procedural changes reflected in the legal documentation from the newly established 
province of Arabia clearly aim at appropriating local documents to the Roman court. For instance, 
in her legal transactions Babatha most of the times appears at court accompanied by a male 
guardian, as requested by Roman law.305 Seeing as neither Babatha nor the majority of people that 
these documents concern were in possession of Roman citizenship, such behaviour shows the 
applicability of Roman legal procedures and legal positions to the native inhabitants on the one 
hand, and locals’ conformity to the requirements of Roman judicial authorities on the other. The use 
of legal guardian is, however, inconsistent throughout the archive: in P.Yadin 25 Babatha acts with 
a guardian, while in P.Yadin 26, drawn up on the very same day, both Babatha and her opponent 
Miryam act independently. Since there was no institution of legal guardianship of women in the 
Eastern laws, such incoherence most likely demonstrates a ‘gradual not yet completed process of 
adaption to Roman formal law’.306 The lawsuit relating to the legal guardianship of Babatha’s minor 
son after the death of his father also reveals her close adherence to the requirements of Roman 
formal law. Contrary to Jewish or other oriental laws, Roman law did not allow women exercise 
legal guardianship: the fact that Babatha nowhere asks to be made the guardian of her son herself 
fits well into the Roman legal practice.307 Furthermore, Babatha’s instigated lawsuit against her 
son’s guardians and her demand for an income ‘befitting the style of life the boy is accustomed to’ 
(P.Yadin 13-15) also indicates a reasonable knowledge of the peculiarities of Roman law pertaining 
to the guardianship of minors. In Roman law, women (mothers, grandmothers, sisters) had a right to 
sue the appointed guardians of their children based on improper, for instance, financially 
insufficient, care or on the grounds of general untrustworthiness.308  
                                                          
303 Isaac (1992), 72.  
304 Contra Goodman (1991) and Cotton (1993), 100. 
305 P.Yadin 16 (census declaration, 127 CE), P.Yadin 17 (a deposit, 128 CE), P.Yadin 22 (Babatha as vendor of date 
crops, 130 CE) etc.  
306 Oudshoorn (2007), 366. 
307 Feminae tutores dari non possunt, D. 26.1.18; Iure nostro tutela communium liberorum matri testamento patris 
frustra mandatur, D. 26.2.26.  
308 Quin immo et mulieres admittuntur [suspectos postulare], sed hae solae, quae pietate necessitudinis ductae ad hoc 
procedunt, ut puta mater, D. 26.10.1.7. The right to remove a tutor was granted at Rome by the praetors and in the 
provinces by their governors (Dig. 26. 10.1.3), see Cotton (1993), 106. 
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However, apart from these examples and the previously discussed actio tutelae which was in fact an 
instrument of Roman substantive law, considerable amount of legal principles applied in the Roman 
courts of Arabia appear to be local in nature. Having analysed internal references to the applicable 
laws rather than the Roman façade of the documents, Oudshoorn points out multiple cases where 
legal acts referred to ‘describe rights that have no basis in Roman law’, e.g. P.Yadin 21-22 or 
P.Yadin 23-24.309 The changes in documentary practice and procedural law may be too often taken 
to suggest a high degree of ‘Romanization’ of law, thus obscuring the fact that, substantially, the 
law applicable in those Roman-like documents could be predominantly local.310 It is nevertheless all 
the more important to note Babatha’s willingness to go through Roman legal procedures and seek 
the assistance of the Roman court, especially if she was not barred from attending a local one and 
thus adhering to local laws. Perhaps, then, what we see is not only the legal manoeuvring and 
joggling of more than one set of legal relations at once, but also an attempt of the local population 
to secure their legal transactions and ensure the enforcement of judicial decisions by appealing to 
the highest judicial authority at hand.     
Yet another comparable example of provincial knowledge of law and proactive agency in asserting 
one’s rights is the famous petition of Dionysia (P.Oxy.2.237), originating in 186 CE in Egypt.  
Dionysia was a woman who bore a Greek name and, presumably, was of Greek descent too, but 
nevertheless held a legal position of an ‘Egyptian’ in the eyes of the Roman authorities.311 Dionysia 
had filed a petition to the Roman prefect asking to settle the dispute between her and her father 
regarding the apospasis, i.e. father’s right to divorce his daughter from her husband – a Hellenistic 
practice non-existent in the Roman law. While her father’s claim is unsurprisingly described as 
pertaining to the ‘laws of the Egyptians’, Dionysia in her defence maintains that ‘no law allowed 
women to be removed from their husbands against their will’ or ‘even if there is such a law, it does 
not apply’ (ll. 7.12 – 8.7).312 This may well be interpreted as Dionysia’s attempt to invalidate the 
claim of her father by appealing to Roman law in which the practice no longer existed.313 
                                                          
309 Oudshoorn (2007), 374. 
310 Surely though, the fact that Roman provincial governors could and would occasionally adjudicate a case according to 
local instead of Roman law should not mean that this was in all cases acceptable, for we read of a legal problem caused 
by one such judgement by a governor who accepted a will in which a father named the mother as guardian of their 
children, this being against Roman law (D. 26.2.26 pr. 4). This judgement was condemned as ‘a mistake made in 
inexperience’, but it is very likely that there have been many more ‘mistakes’ of this sort in the Roman provincial 
administration of justice.  
311 On the grounds that she was neither a Roman citizen nor a Jew, and did not belong to the citizenry of one of the four 
Greek poleis, see Lewis (1983), 31.  
312 The ‘laws of the Egyptians’ was a compilation of both Greek and Egyptian legal principles and practices, used as a 
source of reference by the Roman administrators of justice in settling local disputes. For a more detailed analysis, see 
Bowman (1986). 
313 While apospasis seems to be commonly practiced in Hellenistic law, a father’s attempt to break up harmonious 
marriage in the Roman world was made illegal by Antoninus Pius (r. 138-161).  
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Furthermore, in order to support her position before the Roman prefect, Dionysia refers to previous 
cases, lawyers’ opinions and the decisions previously taken by the Roman governors in settling 
similar disputes.314 The decision of a former prefect quoted as a precedent by Dionysia was to 
disregard the father’s claim and his appeal to the ‘law of the Egyptians’: although recognizing an 
‘Egyptian’ legal practice of apospasis, the prefect had opted to reduce ‘the inhumanity of law’ (μὴ 
ἠκολουθηκέναι τῇ τοῦ νόμου ἀπανθρωπίᾳ, ll. 7.34-35) and ruled instead that ‘the deciding factor is 
with whom the married woman wishes to be’. The conceptual roots of this ruling, according to 
Lewis, are most likely to be found in the Roman ius civile, where the woman in iustae nuptiae 
passed from the potestas of her father into the manus of her husband.315 Dionysia, thus, being well 
aware of the earlier ruling, understood that the court of the Roman prefect was the right body to 
approach in her dispute. In this case we may safely assume that Dionysia’s choice had to do with 
her knowledge of Roman law (or availability of legal advice) and of previously adjudged similar 
cases, no less than with the recognition of the prefect as the highest judicial authority in the 
province. The prefect’s decision quoted in Dionysia’s petition was based on neither pure adherence 
to Roman nor to local law. Instead, he made an ad hoc decision thus creating a precedent to be 
referred to by his successors, which is most likely how the provincial law largely operated.    
Interestingly, the document which was called by Pestman ‘one of the very few examples of pure 
Roman law found in Egypt’ is a Greek copy of a Roman law will, drawn by a certain Longinus 
Castor, a veteran of (probably) Hellenized background, who was nevertheless a native of a small 
Egyptian town of Karanis.316 The will reveals a discharged soldier’s attempt to provide for his 
‘common law’ slave-wives and children within the framework of Roman private law, as was 
predetermined by his acquisition of Roman citizenship upon the end of his military service.317 No 
Latin original of the will survives, only a Greek copy, either drawn for his own personal reference 
or issued after his death (in 194 CE) for the reference of his heirs. All the official prerequisites of a 
Roman mancipatory will are present, together with all the required participants of the verbal 
procedure, such as testator, familiae emptor, libripens, as well as five Roman-citizen witnesses to 
seal the written will. In this case, drawing a Latin will in accordance with Roman law was a 
necessity stemming from the change in one’s status. Nevertheless, the end result also seemingly 
displays negotiation of the two sets of legal relations discernable through Longinus’ attempt to 
circumvent the illegitimacy of children born during his military service (thus, against Roman law) 
by manumitting their enslaved mothers and naming them all heirs. The example of Longinus Castor 
                                                          
314 For a more detailed treatment, see Katzoff (1972), 259.  
315 Lewis (1995), 283.  
316 BGU 1.326 dating to 189/194 CE. Pestman (1990), 202. 
317 See Keenan (1994), 101-107. 
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demonstrates that even the provincials who acquired Roman citizenship and thus fell subject to 
Roman law knew or were able to find out ways how to manipulate even its strictest provisions and 
principles in order to provide for themselves and their families.   
 
Conclusion   
 
Having discussed the situation in post-Social War Italy, touched upon imperial municipalisation of 
Spain and analysed the provincial environment of the mid-second century CE on the grounds of 
legal change and its possible affects to local identities, we are evidently facing an emerging pattern 
of multiplicity of identities resulting from peregrine contact with Rome. Together with the coming 
of Roman administrative and judicial systems, there were inevitable legal, societal and linguistic 
changes undergone by the subject populations. If the adoption of Greek or Latin in indigenous legal 
discourse, the usage of stipulatio or tutela mulieris, and typically Roman documentary forms such 
as diplomata were in fact perceived in association with the Roman authority, and if such an effort of 
conformity with Roman law could be taken up even when the person’s status civitatis ‘disqualified’ 
him from using a Roman-law form, it becomes possible to interpret these formal changes as 
mediators between the imperial centre and provincial periphery. The observance and usage of 
Roman private law institutions that came together with, but, as we have seen in the case of 
municipium Flavium Irnitanum, were not limited to one’s acquisition of Roman citizen status, must 
have exercised a considerable influence on local identities, at least to the extent of offering a new 
set of legal and civic relations in addition to one’s local or regional one.   
Instead of replacement of local legal and civic cultures with a superimposed Roman one, we are 
mostly able to discern the coexistence and interaction of various legal traditions. The plurality of 
laws prevalent in the majority of Roman provinces triggered legal manoeuvring and opportunistic 
behaviour of the subject populations. The Romans did not, as Kantor duly notes, develop any 
universally applicable system for solving ‘conflicts of law’ which would inevitably arise in the 
complex legal environment with more than one legal system in force. The provincials’ enthusiasm 
towards approaching Roman judicial authorities and seeking their assistance in settling disputes is 
discernable in various parts of the Empire and at all social levels, and may thus point not only to the 
recognition of the higher judicial authority, but also to the perception of the Roman (governor’s) 
court as the only one able to resolve disputes stemming from the plurality of enforceable laws.318  
                                                          
318 Cf. Kantor (2012), 80-81 on Roman Asia Minor, and Goodman (1991) on Roman Arabia and provincials’ ‘hope that 
the Roman administration would clear up once and for all longstanding disputes over property rights and the tenure and 
status of land’, 171.   
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Locals’ knowledge of law (availability of legal advice), their recognition of superiority of the 
Roman judicial authorities, as well as willingness to participate in the power negotiations enabled 
voluntary agency and contributed to their conscious construction and employment of multiple and 
non-contradictory identities. While the assumption of a new, Roman identity could be advantageous 
in certain contexts, it need not have impaired one’s retention of a localized one in other 
circumstances, for instance, in holding of local municipal office. Even when one’s adoption of 
Roman juridical identity was predetermined by his or her acquisition of Roman citizenship, it was 
most overtly articulated in cases when Roman affiliation was either beneficial or an official 
requirement was made by Roman private law. The pattern of joggling of multiple juridical, 
linguistic, even cultural identities is not limited to Roman provincial situation and can in fact 
explain much earlier developments in the post-Social War Italy as well as municipal and colonial 
settlements. Roman citizens residing outside Rome too, took part in this ‘shuttle’ of identities, as 
the overarching principle and the driving force behind all agency and legal manoeuvring was the 
degree of beneficial legal protection one could secure.   
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Concluding remarks 
 
The overall conclusion that the investigation into Roman law, citizenship and identity suggests is 
that the possession of citizenship, observation of law and construction of identity seemingly went 
hand in hand, even if not to the same extent and value throughout the Roman Empire, and were 
largely affected not only by governmental decisions, but also by deliberate choices of the subject 
peoples. The situation that we encounter in all parts of the Roman world points to greater 
complexity and diversity of legal and civic relations rather than their uniformity. Furthermore, in 
this diversity, individual agents under the direct Roman rule had a considerable degree of selection 
over the construction and articulation of their own identity.  
While some parts of Roman civil law point to the exclusivity and ‘Romanity’ of certain legal 
institutions, the development of Roman law in itself seemingly sought to provide a reasonable 
framework for legal interaction between the Roman citizens and their peregrine counterparts. The 
very creation of the ius gentium as a body of legal institutions available to peregrines and governing 
their dealings with the Romans, argues against the complete exclusivity of Roman law. Instead, the 
development of the ius gentium and ius honorarium was a way of transforming and expanding the 
boundaries of legal relations, and may thus be seen as an attempt to negotiate these relations with 
those outside the Roman citizen community.  
The apparent fluidity in both the hierarchy and application of Roman laws and legal enactments 
were counterbalanced by a clear hierarchy of authority both in Rome and in its periphery 
throughout the two periods addressed. While there is considerable evidence pointing toward both 
the acknowledgement and the applicability of local laws by the Roman administration of justice, the 
tendency to draw on Roman civil law in cases of doubt remains prevalent and is evident both in the 
municipal legislation and in the provincial documentary record. The voluntary adoption of Roman 
laws by the Italian allies in the Republican period, as well as enthusiastic use of Roman courts and 
available Roman law institutions by peregrines under the Empire reveal patterns of manipulation 
and legal manoeuvring, no less than recognition of the hierarchy of authority. Rome’s acquisition of 
a foreign territory thus inevitably meant a redefined set of legal relations to all those who fell 
subject to the realm, even when the local legal autonomy was proclaimed.  
The extension of Roman citizenship, i.e. the bestowal of Roman legal status on peregrines, 
primarily meant admittance of a community or an individual into the Roman political body through 
the grant of franchise. On a more personal level, then, one’s acquisition of the Roman civitas came 
to define his or her belonging to the Roman citizenry, and thus having a share in its legal rights and 
73 
 
obligations. Since the actual political influence which a newly enfranchised individual or 
community could exercise in Rome remained relatively small throughout the period addressed, the 
importance of safeguarding one’s legal and business transactions, as well as protection against 
magisterial abuse were seemingly amongst the major incentives for the peregrine strive towards 
Roman citizenship. To the economic advantages, such as participation in land distribution schemes 
or ability to inherit from a Roman citizen, one should add a reasonable expectation that the 
citizenship and its law would provide protection in exchange to fulfilment of required obligations. 
The ‘collective wish’ for Roman citizenship sought by Mouritsen in order to explain the ‘Italian 
question’ may thus have mattered a great deal less, as the influential local elites were already 
familiar with the benefits of admission to the Roman citizenry, communicated to them through 
administration, military service, as well as legislation such as the Lex Acilia de repetundis.  
Both the acquisition of Roman citizenship and the, either consequential or independently exercised, 
observance of Roman law presupposed assumption of a new, Roman, juridical identity. It did not, 
however, completely rule out one’s retention of local legal and civic affiliations, as the joggling of 
two (or more) sets of legal relations was evidently possible throughout the periods addressed. While 
the admission to Roman citizenry entailed certain legal and linguistic demands, the adoption of 
Latin outside the legal discourse as well as the prevalence of strongly articulated ‘Roman’ identity 
in predominantly non-Roman environment largely occurred by deliberate choice, just like the 
assertion of local (Oscan) identity in Bantia. One’s public affirmation of Roman legal or civic 
status, thus, need not have infringed the retention of local cultural identity: ample literary, 
epigraphic and documentary evidence often reveal construction and assertion of coexistent multiple 
identities in both Republican and Imperial periods alike.  
Conscious opportunistic behaviour, knowledge and availability of law, as well as recognition of 
superiority of Roman judicial authorities (in terms of expediency no less than ability to settle 
disputes based on conflict of laws) equally contributed to the reception of Roman law in the 
periphery of Rome. The fact that the Roman ius civile and its legal institutions became 
progressively important to non-Roman subjects (cf. Babatha’s possession of actio tutelae) should be 
interpreted not as evidence for the ‘Romanization’ of law, but rather as a result of native agency  as 
well as assumption of multiple, context-specific identities. Although Roman law was in a lot of 
ways more intrusive into the personal behaviour of both Roman citizens and peregrines than is 
widely assumed,319 the importance of protection of one’s person, family and property, remained 
crucial to peoples’ legal activity. This notion applies both to the allied wish for citizenship and to 
                                                          
319 See Kantor (2012), 58-60. 
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the mid-second century provincial agency. The evidence for strive towards assertion of beneficial 
status, legal manoeuvring and opportunistic behaviour thus permeates the Roman world throughout 
the periods addressed, and is characteristic of subject people of all social levels alike.  
Although the present thesis had its focus set mainly on non-Romans, i.e. the ‘receiving end’ of the 
spread of Roman legal and civic institutions, there is considerable reason to believe that the Roman 
identity too was no less redefined by the various developments discussed above. The self-definition 
of the populus Romanus at first glance continued to rest on their ius civile and the shared civitas 
Romana: Gaius in the mid-second century CE still refers his reader to each and every ius proprium 
Romanorum, just as the senatorial opposition to citizenship extension, although no longer effective, 
persists all the way into the High Empire. Nevertheless, these too may be taken as indicative of the 
need for reassurance of one’s identity – this time on the part of the Romans – possibly stemming 
from the growing awareness of multiplicity of coexisting and not infrequently competing sets of 
legal, civic and cultural affiliations constituting what was proudly called imperium Romanum.     
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